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I. Introduction
The first part of this Article' suggests a framework for
understanding Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania constitu-
tion.2 This second and final part of the Article outlines ways in
which that framework should be applied.
The framework described in the first part of the Article would
change the way the Amendment has been viewed in fundamental
ways. Article I, Section 27 contains two separate provisions or
clauses- environmental rights and public trust.3 Because these
provisions apply to different environmental resources or values,
give different rights to the public, and reflect different understand-
ings of the government's responsibilities, they must necessarily be
analyzed separately. This reading of the Amendment is based on
its text and legislative history, as well as conventional interpretative
rules for the constitution.4 But it is quite different from virtually
all recent cases, which tend to treat the Amendment as an
undivided whole. The principle exceptions to this tendency to treat
the Amendment as a single rule are also two of the most important
cases, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
5
1. See John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It
Protects the Environment: Part I-An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103
DICK. L. REv. 693 (1999) [hereinafter Part 1].
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Section 27 provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Id.
3. The environmental rights clause is contained in the Amendment's first sentence:
"The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment." Id.
The public trust clause is contained in the second and third sentences of Article I,
Section 27: "Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people." Id.
4. See Part I, supra note 1, at 700-04.
5. 13 Adams County Legal J. 45 (jurisdiction), 75 (opinion of the court), & 134
(supplemental opinion of the court) (Pa. Com. P1. 1971), affd 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973); see
also Part 1, supra note 1, at 704-08 (discussing Gettysburg Tower).
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and Payne v. Kassab.6 Even these cases, however, do not always
clearly distinguish the two parts of the Amendment.
In addition, Article I, Section 27 fosters conservation or
sustainable development. Contrary to claims made in many of the
early cases, the Amendment is not anti-development.7 Once again,
the text, legislative history, and constitutional interpretative rules
all demonstrate that Article I, Section 27 was designed to protect
the environment for human benefit and use. Rather than trumping
or being trumped by the due process or takings clauses, the
Amendment must be read in a way that gives meaning to both
property rights and environmental protection. 8
Another part of this framework is that governmental responsi-
bilities under the Amendment's text provide the foundation for
Article I, Section 27 Because constitutional provisions generally
either limit the government's power or require the government to
act in some way, this approach to Article I, Section 27 is well
within traditional approaches to constitutional law. Once we
understand the government's responsibilities, we also understand
what relief citizens can seek. Unfortunately, the case law does not
reflect a textually-based understanding of the government's
responsibilities."
The final part of this framework is a more constructive and
useful role for the courts." That role is premised on recognition
that legislative and administrative decision making should continue
to predominate in the environmental area for a variety of reasons.
When such decisions provide at least as much protection as Article
I, Section 27, judicial enforcement of the Amendment is unneces-
sary. Courts should nonetheless be willing to apply Article I,
Section 27 substantively when gaps exist. Although this is a
straightforward way to apply constitutional provisions, Pennsylvania
courts have not yet applied the Amendment in this manner.1 2 On
the other hand, courts have used, and should continue to use,
Article I, Section 27 to support or reinforce the exercise of
6. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff'd 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976); see also Part 1,
supra note 1, at 708-12 (discussing Payne).
7. See Part I, supra note 1, at 714-16.
8. See id. at 716-22.
9. See id. at 722-24.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 724-33.
12. See Part 1, supra note 1, at 727-31.
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legislative or administrative authority to protect the principles
identified in the Amendment. 3
This four-piece framework provides the basis for the remainder
of the Article. Section II of this Article addresses substantive
applications of the Amendment, while Section III discusses
principle-reinforcing applications.
Section II begins by examining one of the most basic issues in
the implementation of Article I, Section 27-whether the Amend-
ment creates self-executing substantive rules. The tendency to treat
the Amendment as an undivided whole has masked the reality of
at least three different self-executing applications of Article I,
Section 27. Most prominently, the Gettysburg Tower case estab-
lished a self-executing right by the government against private
parties to protect the public's environmental rights. In that case,
however, the supreme court's plurality suggested that the environ-
mental rights part or clause of the Amendment is also self-
executing against the government.14 Similarly, in Payne, the
supreme court reasoned that the public trust part or clause of the
Amendment-which also is directed against government-is self-
executing. t5 Because direct application of a constitutional provi-
sion to private behavior is unusual, and because constitutional
provisions generally limit government, these latter two applications
have enormous importance even though they have not been well
recognized.
Section II then explains how courts might apply the substantive
rules contained in each clause of the Amendment. The public trust
clause requires an understanding of the trust corpus (publicly-
owned natural resources), the trustee (state), the beneficiaries (the
public, including future generations), and the substantive obliga-
tions of the trustee (to conserve and maintain these resources).
Because the state's obligation to "conserve and maintain" public
natural resources "for the benefit of all the people" is stated in the
Amendment itself,6 this obligation should be the basic benchmark
against which state decisions concerning management of these
resources are judged. These responsibilities, moreover, apply to
any government agency or municipality whose decisions affect
13. See id. at 731-33.
14. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 592 (Pa.
1973).
15. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976).
16. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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public natural resources. The commonwealth court's three-part
Payne test for applying the public trust clause, 7 by contrast,
ignores these constitutionally-stated responsibilities entirely, and
should be eliminated (although the Payne holding need not be
overruled).
The environmental rights clause is broader in scope than the
public trust clause, protecting clean air and pure water, and
requiring preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic
values of the environment. Courts should read the environmental
rights clause to prohibit the state, including any state agency or
municipality whose decisions affect these resources or values, from
interfering with their protection. The state may file an action to
prevent private parties from interfering with those rights, but there
is little basis for allowing citizens to directly challenge the actions
of other citizens.
Principle-reinforcing applications of the Amendment are
discussed in Section III. Significantly, most of these applications
have already been recognized by Pennsylvania courts. As United
Artists' Theater Circuit v. City of Philadelphia"8 and other cases
suggest, the Amendment confirms and extends the police power to
further both parts of Article I, Section 27, provides guidance in
statutory interpretation, and supports the constitutionality of laws
whose constitutionality has been challenged on other grounds.
The public trust clause also suggests the need for judicial
recognition of several subsidiary rules that reinforce the state's
substantive obligations. In private trust law, the trustee is obliged
to keep track of the trust corpus, to report to the beneficiary at the
beneficiary's request on the status of the trust corpus, and to permit
third-party auditing of the trustee's accounts.19  These rules
reinforce the trustee's responsibility to properly maintain the trust
corpus. Similarly here, the state should be obliged to inventory the
public natural resources for which it is responsible, to issue periodic
public reports on their status, indicating threats to these natural
resources and what the state intends to do about them, and to
subject its accounting to third-party auditing. Such obligations
would reinforce the state's substantive obligations under the
17. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
18. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993) (overruling 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991)).
19. See infra notes 318-24 and accompanying text.
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Amendment. They would also force the state to deal with its trust
responsibilities in a more holistic manner.
II. Substantive Rules
A. Three Self-Executing Applications
Three decades after Article I, Section 27 was overwhelmingly
approved by Pennsylvania voters, the question persists whether the
Amendment is self-executing- that is, whether the Amendment
establishes substantive rules that can be enforced in the absence of
implementing legislation. The Pennsylvania supreme court decided
in Gettysburg Tower that the environmental rights clause is a self-
executing substantive rule that the government can enforce
judicially.2  Yet the supreme court continues to write opinions
saying only that a plurality of that court would have decided that
the Amendment is not self-executing.1 More basically, perhaps,
the question regarding self-execution continues to be asked as if the
Amendment were an undivided whole -an assumption that ignores
the separate public trust and environmental rights clauses of Article
I, Section 27. In both the Gettysburg Tower and Payne cases,
however, the supreme court held or stated that three separate
applications of Article I, Section 27 were self-executing.2 Two of
these applications are against the government, and only one is
against private persons.'
Perhaps the strongest case for a self-executing application can
be made for the public trust clause, which creates specific govern-
mental obligations. The next strongest case for a self -executing
application can be made for the environmental rights clause, but as
a limitation on government. The weakest self-executing claim is for
the environmental rights clause as authority for the government to
challenge private activity in court, and yet this is the application
that Pennsylvania courts accepted in Gettysburg Tower.24 Because
20. See infra text accompanying notes 25-44.
21. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, 635 A.2d at 620; see also Harley v. Schuylkill
County, 476 F. Supp. 191,195 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign
v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 485 A.2d 1, 11 (Pa. Super Ct. 1984) (erroneously citing
Gettysburg Tower for proposition that Amendment is not self-executing).
22. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973);
Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), affd. 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
23. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d 588; Payne, 312 A.2d 86.
24. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 13 Adams County Legal J. 75, aff'd 302 A.2d 886, 311
A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
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that application is good law, the other two must also be. Moreover,
because the other two applications are different, they should be
judged on their own merits rather than through the lens of
Gettysburg Tower. Yet Gettysburg Tower was decided first, and
thus will be discussed first.
1. Environmental Rights.
a. Against Private Parties. -The Amendment's first sentence
provides: "The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment."'  In Gettysburg Tower, the Pennsylvania
Attorney General brought an action against the developer of a
proposed observation tower on private land just outside the
boundary of Gettysburg Battlefield National Park. The state
claimed that the 307-foot tower would interfere with the natural,
scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the Gettysburg area, and
particularly those held by visitors to the park.26 The Gettysburg
Tower case was tried and decided based on the claim that the right
to protection of those values under Article I, Section 27 imposed
a substantive limitation on private development.27 This required
a prior decision on the question of whether this right is self-execut-
ing. The Gettysburg Tower courts uniformly held that it is.2
Although the entire Amendment is quoted throughout the
opinions, virtually all of their analysis focuses on the Amendment's
first sentence.29
The court of common pleas held the environmental rights
clause to be self-executing before it decided that the state had not
shown a violation of the rights stated in that sentence.3" The
25. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
26. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 302 A.2d 886,887-88 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973).
27. See Part 1, supra note 1, at 704-08.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 30-44.
29. See id. The environmental rights and public trust parts of the Amendment are
occasionally treated as synonymous, however. The supreme court concurring opinion, for
example, focuses on natural and historic resources, and suggests that "natural and historic
resources are the common property of the state." Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 595 (Pa. 1973) (citation omitted). Wholly apart from the
merit of that proposition for the property in question here, the concurring opinion is using
language that refers primarily to the public trust part of the Amendment.
30. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams County Legal
J. 75, 79-80 (Pa. Com. P1. 1971).
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commonwealth court affirmed,3' and the supreme court affirmed
the commonwealth court's decision. But the supreme court did so
with three opinions-a plurality opinion that was signed by two
justices with a third concurring only in the result,32 a concurring
opinion signed by two justices,33 and a dissenting opinion by the
remaining two. 4
The plurality voted to affirm the commonwealth court's
decision because, in its view, the Amendment is not self-executing.
Because the Amendment is not self-executing, the plurality
reasoned, the state lost not because it failed to prove its case, but
because the Amendment provides no basis for a lawsuit.35 The
plurality therefore found it unnecessary to reach the merits.36
In a concurring opinion, two other justices essentially support-
ed both the common pleas court and commonwealth court
decisions. The justices reasoned that "the Commonwealth, even
prior to the recent adoption of Article I, Section 27 possessed the
inherent sovereign power to protect and preserve for its citizens the
natural and historic resources now enumerated in Section 27."
37
In their view, however, the Attorney General had failed to demon-
strate that the state was entitled to equitable relief.38 Although
this opinion did not expressly state that the Amendment is self-
executing, it is best read to say so. In stating that their reasons for
supporting affirmance of the commonwealth court are different
than those of the plurality, the two justices suggested that they did
not agree with the plurality.39  The concurring opinion did not
argue that the state lacked the ability to bring such suits in the
absence of legislation. Nor would it have made much sense for the
opinion to draw that conclusion, particularly because it argued that
the state has had all along the authority to bring this kind of action.
Because the only articulated source of authority for the govern-
ment's action was Article I, Section 27, the concurring opinion
31. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 302 A.2d 886.
32. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 589 (plurality opinion, labeled "opinion of
the court," by O'Brien and Pomeroy, JJ., with Nix, J., concurring in the result).
33. See id. at 595 (concurring opinion by Roberts and Eagen, JJ.).
34. See id. at 596 (dissenting opinion by Manderino and Jones, JJ.).
35. See id. at 590-95.
36. See id.
37. Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 595.
38. See id. at 596.
39. See id. at 595.
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implicity supports the proposition that the environmental rights
clause provides a self-executing basis for the government's action.
The dissenting opinion, which was signed by two justices,
expressly states that the amendment is self-executing.40  The
dissent then argued that the state had presented "compelling
evidence" that the tower would "desecrate the natural, scenic,
esthetic and historic values of the Gettysburg environment,, 41 and
said it would enjoin the tower's construction based on Article I,
Section 27.42
Thus, four of the supreme court's seven justices concluded that
the public right stated in the Amendment's first sentence is self-
executing.43 Two said so expressly, and two wrote an opinion that
is best read that way. A majority of the supreme court thus
concluded that the environmental rights clause is self-executing
insofar as it authorizes government actions against private parties.
There is another reason for this result. A supreme court
opinion is precedential only if it is joined by a majority of the
justices who participated in the case. Plurality opinions do not
create binding precedent." The supreme court affirmed the
commonwealth court's decision, and failed to produce a majority
for the proposition that the Amendment is not self-executing. The
commonwealth court holding that the Amendment is self-executing
thus stands.
The reasons articulated by the various opinions explain and
justify this result. To be self-executing, a provision of the Pennsyl-
vania constitution must 1) not contain language indicating "an
intent to require legislation" and 2) be capable of "given effect
without the aid of legislation., 45  The court opinions show that
this application of the environmental rights clause met both
requirements.
40. See id. at 597.
41. Id. at 597. The opinion cited the testimony of many witnesses, including the
Director of the National Park Service, who called the tower an "absolute monstrosity." Id.
at 597-98. The dissent also argued that the Park Service had never approved of the tower,
but had only entered the agreement to minimize its impact on the park. See id. at 598 n.3.
42. Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 599.
43. See id. at 595-96 (concurring opinion) & 596-99 (dissenting opinion).
44. See G. RONALD DARLINGTON ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE PRACTICE
§ 3102:2 & nn.15 & 18 (2d ed. 1997) (containing citations to Pennsylvania court decisions).
45. In re Larsen, 655 A.2d 239, 243 (Pa. 1995) (citing ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYL-
VANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (1985)).
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The environmental rights clause contains no express reference
to legislative implementation.4 6 The absence of such language
distinguishes it from another constitutional amendment that was
approved in the same referendum 4 7 as well as environmental
amendments in other states. 48  Because the legislature wrote the
Amendment without such language, it evidently sought to create
judicially enforceable public rights. 49 The Amendment's place-
ment in Article I of the constitution also indicates that it was
intended to be self-executing. Article I, which is entitled "Declara-
tion of Rights," contains other historic rights and freedoms whose
meaning is also determined independently of legislative action.5"
Where legislative implementation would render a constitutional
amendment meaningless, moreover, it should be held to be self-
executing.5" This is particularly important because of the lengthy
legislative approval and public referendum process required of
constitutional amendments in Pennsylvania.5 2 Here, the state
already had some authority prior to the Amendment to bring
actions to protect similar public environmental rights. Under the
parens patriae doctrine, states can bring suit "on behalf of the
citizens and in the interests of the community or as trustee of the
state's public resources., 53 Although the standard parens patriae
46. See Larsen, 655 A.2d at 243 (constitutional provision expressly creating Judicial
Conduct Board and Court of Judicial Discipline is self-executing); Lennox v. Clark, 93 A.2d
834 (Pa. 1953) (constitutional provision stating that Philadelphia county offices are "hereby"
abolished, and that this provision "shall become effective immediately upon its adoption,"
is self-executing).
47. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams County Legal
J. 75, 79 (Pa. Com. P1. 1971).
48. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 597.
49. See id. In addition, previous Amendments to Article I of the state constitution,
which contain a declaration of rights, were held to be self-executing. See id. at 592 (citing
Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79 (1903)).
50. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 302 A.2d 886, 892 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973). The provisions of Article I are "recognized and unalterably established."
PA. CONST. art. I (preamble). In addition, "everything in this article is excepted out of the
general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate." PA. CONST. art 1, § 25.
These statements also indicate that Section 27 was intended to have independent meaning.
51. See Lennox, 93 A.2d at 839 ("[I]t would be wholly incredible to suppose that the
only accomplishment intended by the City-County Consolidation Amendment was the merely
puerile one of a change of titles, and that for such a superficial purpose alone two successive
legislatures voted upon the amendment and the citizens of the Commonwealth adopted it at
a statewide election!").
52. See PA. CONST. art. XI.
53. Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 595-96 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).
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case in environmental settings involves a state's challenge to
pollution originating out of state,54 there is no doctrinal basis
preventing its application to private defendants located in the same
state. In this case, the state brought an action that was akin to
a parens patriae or public nuisance action. Moreover, the environ-
mental rights clause plainly embraces many environmental
situations that could be challenged in such an action. The
Amendment cannot reasonably be read to restrict that authority,
or to provide less authority than already existed.56
This application of Article I, Section 27 is also capable of being
given effect without implementing legislation.57 The text of the
Amendment is no more general, and thus no more requiring of
legislative definition, than constitutional provisions concerning
freedom of religion and speech. 58 In fact, clean air, pure water,
and natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values arguably have more
precise meaning than concepts such as due process that the courts
have not hesitated to define.59
The supreme court plurality, which would have decided that
the first sentence is not self-executing, was concerned that the
Amendment seemed to give the government significant new power
and was exercising it against a private landowner.' The generali-
ty of the language in the environmental rights clause contributed to
that concern.61 Yet the common pleas court held that when the
54. See Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 236; see also Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 219.
55. See Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae
Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 686 (1998) (only significant controversy over defendants is inclusion
of federal government, agencies, and officers as defendants). Within a state, an action to
protect public rights in an environmental setting would most likely be characterized as a
public nuisance action. Indeed, the parens patriae cases tend to be public nuisance cases.
See Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 242.
56. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 595-96.
57. Compare Commonwealth ex rel. Crow v. Smith, 23 A.2d 440 (Pa. 1942) (constitu-
tional provision prohibiting a person holding an office of trust or profit under United States
from holding state office does not require implementing legislation) with Eagen v. Smith, 78
A.2d 801 (Pa. 1951) (constitutional provisions concerning filling of judicial vacancies by
election require legislative establishment of election procedure, and are therefore not self-
executing).
58. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 302 A.2d 886, 892 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973).
59. See id.
60. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 592 (Pa. 1973) ("The Commonwealth has
cited no example of a situation where a constitutional provision which expanded the powers
of government to act against individuals was held to be self-executing.").
61. See id. Such a grant of power to government would leave private property owners
subject to uncertain standards and perhaps inconsistent government enforcement, in violation
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government seeks an injunction it must 1) demonstrate irreparable
harm to the values stated in the Amendment and 2) prove its case
by clear and convincing evidence.62 As the outcome in Gettysburg
Tower indicates, these requirements limit the government's ability
to seek judicial vindication of environmental rights in questionable
cases.
Moreover, Gettysburg Tower does not stand for the proposition
that citizens can directly enforce the environmental rights clause
against private parties. The state attorney general, after all,
brought that case. Although it was plainly intended that the
environmental rights clause would be a basis for citizen lawsuits,
that intention was based on an analogy between the environmental
rights clause and the rights contained in the Pennsylvania Declara-
tion of Rights or the U.S. Bill of Rights.63 Those rights, however,
generally are enforceable against the government rather than
private parties.'
of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 593.
The plurality was also concerned that the inclusion of esthetic and historic values in the
environmental rights clause gave the government power it previously lacked. See id. at 592.
The plurality opinion did not respond directly to the justifications provided by the
court of common pleas and commonwealth court, particularly those relating to legislative
intent and the role of the courts in interpreting the values stated in the Amendment's first
sentence.
62. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams County Legal
J. 75, 83 (Pa. Com. P1. 1971) (opinion of the court); see also id. at 135 (supplemental opinion
of court).
63. See Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion: Twenty Years Later and Largely Untested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 124 (1990).
64. Indeed, the direct application of constitutional rules by citizens to other private
parties in the federal constitution is highly unusual. See J.B. Ruh], The Metrics of
Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don't
Measure Up, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 245,260-61 (1999) (identifying only two Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution that provide for such actions-U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing
slavery) and U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (prohibiting the sale of liquor)). The latter, of
course, has been repealed. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
Similarly, the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania constitution generally imposes
limits on government, not private parties. See PA. CONST. art. I; see also Western
Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 515
A.2d 1331, 1334-46 (Pa. 1986) (Declaration of Rights is a limitation on state power, and does
not govern relationships among individuals). But see Nancy M. Burkoff, Individual Rights
and the Pennsylvania Constitution: Is There a State Action Requirement?, 67 TEMPLE L. REV.
1051 (1994) (arguing that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides a private right of action
against other private parties in some circumstances). The environmental rights clause in
Article I, Section 27 contains no language expressly limiting its application to state action.
Still, its placement in Article I suggests an implied state action limit.
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b. Against Government. -The Gettysburg Tower case
suggests another approach to using Article I, Section 27-a direct
restraint on government actions that would interfere with environ-
mental rights. Unlike the public trust clause, which explicitly
assigns the state a trusteeship responsibility for public resources,
the environmental rights clause is silent about the state's responsi-
bility to protect environmental rights. The various opinions in
Gettysburg Tower suggest that the environmental rights clause has
at least two consequences for the state. As already noted, the state
has legal authority to exercise discretion to enforce the environ-
mental rights under Article I, Section 27.65 In addition, the
supreme court plurality opinion, which stated that the Amendment
is not self-executing, recognized an exception to that conclusion.'
The Amendment's first sentence is self-executing, the plurality
suggested, to the extent that "it limits the right of government to
interfere" with the public rights protected under Article I, Section
27.67 This reading, the plurality stated, would be consistent with
the other rights stated in Article I of the state constitution, all of
which limit the power of government in some way.68 Because the
other supreme court opinions concluded that the environmental
rights clause is self-executing, the entire court agreed (albeit
indirectly and in dicta) that this clause imposes a self-executing
limit on governmental action. In addition to conferring the
authority to bring actions to vindicate public rights, therefore, the
Amendment also prevents the state from interfering with these
rights.
This conclusion makes sense for the same reasons as those
stated in Gettysburg Tower, and for several additional reasons.
The language of Article I, Section 27 indicates no intent to require
legislation to limit the government's ability to interfere with
environmental rights. The environmental rights identified in the
65. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 13 Adams County Legal J. at 80-81, 86, affd, 302 A.2d
at 892. The courts did not hold, and could not have held, that the Attorney General is
obliged to file lawsuits whenever Article I, Section 27 rights are threatened.
66. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 592 (Pa.
1973). In discussing the Amendment's first sentence, moreover, the commonwealth court
reasoned that Section 27 "is more than a declaration of rights to not be denied by
government; it establishes rights to be protected by government." See Gettysburg Battlefield,
302 A.2d at 892.
67. Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 592.
68. See id.
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Amendment's first sentence cannot be protected unless that
sentence limits contrary government actions. A basic concern of
the Amendment's drafters, moreover, was ensuring that the state
supported environmental protection rather than environmental
degradation.69
The environmental rights clause is also capable of being
applied against the government without legislation. It is no more
general than other provisions in the Declaration of Rights. These
other provisions, moreover, impose limits on the government; the
application of Article I, Section 27 as a limit on government
authority is thus consistent with those other provisions. Every
executive agency has a responsibility under the equal protection
provisions of the state and federal constitutions, for example. No
one would say that the Agriculture Department could refuse to hire
blacks, Hispanics, or women because civil rights were under the
jurisdiction of another agency. Similarly, no one should say that
the Agriculture Department, or any other state agency, can ignore
public rights to the preservation of certain environmental values
because some other agency has responsibility for them. Finally, as
the state has recognized in other environmental contexts, 70 the
government should not ask private parties to do that which it is
unwilling to do.
Self-executing application of the environmental rights provision
against government also avoids the concerns of the supreme court
plurality in Gettysburg Tower. When the government is violating
public rights, it is quite simply in a different position than when it
seeks an injunction against a private person. The use of the
Amendment to limit government actions that interfere with
environmental rights involves fewer questions about adequate
notice, due process, and constitutional takings for private property
owners.
71
69. See FRANKLIN L. KURY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC ESTATE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 27 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 1-4 (1985).
70. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.1503-1505 (West 1997) (requiring state
agencies to implement recycling and waste reduction programs as well as programs to
procure goods with recycled content). These obligations were imposed at the same time that
the state launched a massive mandatory recycling program for people living in large and
medium-sized communities. See id. § 4000.1501.
71. As a practical result, the government may be obliged to adopt or modify legislation
or regulations that would protect these rights. But the adoption or modification of legislation
or regulations to fill existing legislative gaps will not necessarily occur unless the environmen-
tal rights clause is understood to impose a self-executing limitation on government.
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Unfortunately, this conclusion has received relatively little
attention in the litigation brought under the Amendment, even
though there is abundant evidence that state laws and policies
adversely affect the values identified in the Amendment's first
sentence.7 2 Yet this application of Article I, Section 27 could have
significant and positive consequences.
These consequences are evident from an examination of
Community College of Delaware County v. Fox,73 in which the
commonwealth court held that the Department of Environmental
Resources could be held responsible under Article I, Section 27 for
only those environmental effects that were within the scope of its
own statutes. 74 In this case, a citizen and a nonprofit organization
challenged the Department's issuance of a sewer extension,
claiming that the agency failed to consider the long-range and
indirect effects of the permitted action, particularly the possibility
that the extension would encourage development of open land that
should be considered for use as a recreational or natural area or
state park.75  Because the appellants sought to protect water
quality and ensure that ostensibly private land would remain as
open space, their claims fell within the scope of the environmental
rights clause. 76 The Environmental Hearing Board, which hears
appeals of Department decisions, made detailed factual findings on
the possible adverse environmental effects of such development.77
The Board sustained the challenge, concluding that neither the
Department nor any local government had considered alternatives
to conventional development.8
The commonwealth court reversed, holding that the depart-
ment could not be responsible under Article I, Section 27 for the
land's development so long as the department complied with its
72. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 21ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENT
COMMISSION at 16-17 (1998) (laws and policies encourage sprawl), 19-20 & 25 (laws and
policies hurt historic preservation) [hereinafter REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION].
73. 342 A.2d 468 (Pa. Communw. Ct. 1975), appeal dismissed as moot, 381 A.2d 48 (Pa.
1977).
74. See id. at 482.
75. See id.
76. Although not decided, the water quality claim also comes under the state's public
trust obligations under Article I, Section 27.
77. See Fox, 342 A.2d at 472-73.
78. See id. (quoting the findings of the hearing board).
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own statutes.79 The problem, from the commonwealth court's
perspective, was that the determination of which lands are to be
kept as open space is "within the statutory authority not of [the
Department] but of the various boroughs, townships, counties and
cities of the Commonwealth pursuant to a long series of legislative
enactments."" While these municipal authorities were also
responsible for complying with Article I, Section 27 under their
own statutes, their failure to consider the use of these lands for
open space could not be raised in a challenge to the department's
issuance of a permit.
This case would have been decided differently if the citizens
had argued, and the court had decided, that Gettysburg Tower
imposed a self-executing limit on government authority. The court
would have ensured that the Department's decision did not
interfere with preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic values of the environment or the public's right to clean air
and pure water. Because the environmental rights clause imposes
a substantive limitation on the Department, the Department
necessarily has a procedural obligation to consider in advance the
potential effects of its actions on those rights.
Nor does the environmental rights clause simply limit state
agencies. As Fox recognized, municipalities are covered by Article
I, Section 27 because they are subdivisions of the state." Local
governments, too, are prohibited from interfering with pure water,
clean air, and the preservation of certain environmental values.
They, too, must therefore consider in advance the potential effects
79. See id. at 479-82. Similarly, in Swartwood v. Dep't of Environmental Resources, 424
A.2d 993 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), the court rejected an Article I, Section 27 claim that the
Department abused its discretion in failing to consider alternatives to locating proposed
apartment buildings in an agricultural and woodland area. The court held that the
Department has no statutory authority over open space protection and that municipalities
have such authority. See id; see also Fuller v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 599 A.2d 248 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (location of sewage treatment plant cannot be challenged under Article
I, Section 27 in appeal of permit issued under statute that does not give department authority
over location); Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Precision Tube Co., 358 A.2d 137, 140 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976) ("Article I, Section 27 ... does not expand the statutory power of DER
in passing on permit applications to require it to consider additional criteria"); Borough of
Moosic v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 429 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (following
Fox).
80. Fox, 342 A.2d at 481. The court cited to the Municipalities Planning Code, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11201 (West 1997) and the Eminent Domain Code, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to 1-903 (West 1997). See id.
81. See id. at 481-82.
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of their actions. Where authority concerning the values protected
by the first sentence is divided between state and local agencies,
therefore, that division cannot be used to frustrate the protection
of environmental rights.
This approach would create parity between private and
governmental parties whose decisions are challenged under the
Amendment's first sentence. It would also correct problems
created by Fox without requiring reversal of that case. The Fox
case allows the fragmentation of governmental decision-making and
the existence of statutory gaps to provide legal defenses to
governmental actions that are destructive of the principles stated in
the environmental rights clause.8" This is especially true for state
and local decisions that affect land use because suburban sprawl
has a serious and continuing adverse effect on the natural, scenic,
historic, and esthetic values of the environment. Applying
Gettysburg Tower to government decisions would help ensure that
the values identified by the Amendment are protected in the first
place, even if that would ultimately require amendment of the
underlying statutes.
Although the government plainly has an important role to play
in enforcing environmental rights, the Amendment's drafters
contemplated that citizens would also file lawsuits against the
government based on claimed violations of environmental rights.83
Because the government has lawful cause to seek an injunction
under Article I, Section 27 whenever a person threatens or causes
harm to the values and resources protected by the environmental
rights clause, citizens surely have the same self-executing right
against the government. To have standing, citizen plaintiffs would
have to allege a substantial, direct, and immediate infringement by
the government of their environmental rights, and a direct causal
connection between the act complained of and the harm alleged.84
82. The Fox court was legitimately concerned with the finality of local government
decisions. If a citizen does not exercise his or her statutory right to appeal a local agency
decision, he or she should not be able to challenge the local decision by appealing a related
state decision. See Fox, 342 A.2d at 478-49. On the other hand, there needs to be a judicial
forum where the cumulative and synergistic effects of multiple agency decisions involving the
same project or resource can be evaluated.
83. Kury, supra note 63, at 124.
84. See Sierra Club v. Hartman, 605 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1992); William Penn Parking Garage
v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975).
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2. Public Trust-The public trust clause of the Amendment
provides the following: "Pennsylvania's public natural resources are
the common property of all the people, including generations yet
to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.1
85
The duty of administrative agencies and municipalities to protect
public natural resources under their control or influence is self-
executing. As a result, these trustees are obliged to conserve and
maintain those resources regardless of their explicit statutory
authority.
In Payne v. Kassab, citizens unsuccessfully challenged a street-
widening project encroaching on a public commons.8 6 They
alleged, among other things, that the project was inconsistent with
the state's public trust obligations under Article I, Section 27. The
commonwealth court's decision in Payne included a conclusion of
law that "Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is
a self-executing provision in accordance with doctrines of public
trust ... ."87 In affirming the commonwealth court, the supreme
court said it saw no need to decide whether the first sentence of the
Amendment is self-executing. That question may be important
when the state "is seeking to curtail or prevent the otherwise
entirely legal use of private property" on the ground that it
impinges on natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values, the court
reasoned, referring to Gettysburg Tower:
Here, however, the shoe is on the other foot, as it were. There
can be no question that the Amendment itself declares and
creates a public trust of public natural resources for the benefit
of all the people (including future generations as yet unborn)
and that the Commonwealth is made the trustee of said
resources, commanded to conserve and maintain them. No
implementing legislation is needed to enunciate these broad
85. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
86. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) affd, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa.
1976).
87. Id. at 97. The court added that it "represents a proper exercise of state powers
within the scope of the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. Five of
the court's seven judges signed that opinion. Bowman, P.J., concurred in the result but
stated that Article I, Section 27 is not self-executing and Wilkinson, J., concurred in the
result but stated that it was not necessary for the court to decide whether Article I, Section
27 is self-executing. See id. at 97-98.
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purposes and establish these relationships; the Amendment does
so by its own ipse dixit.'
The court then concluded that the state had not violated its public
trust responsibilities under the Amendment because of various
environmental safeguards built into the project by statute.89
The Payne decisions leave no question that the trustees have
some self-executing responsibilities, but it is not clear what those
responsibilities are. The Commonwealth court's opinion suggests
that these responsibilities are defined by a three-part test.9° The
supreme court's opinion suggests that these responsibilities are
defined by the Amendment itself.9' In addition to being more
authoritative, the supreme court's view represents a proper
interpretation of Article I, Section 27.
The public trust clause is self-executing for the same reasons
as the environmental rights clause, and for additional reasons.
These additional reasons include the state's explicit obligation to
protect public trust resources, and the public trust clause's continu-
ity with the historic application of common law public trust
doctrines in Pennsylvania.
Unlike other state constitutional provisions, and unlike
environmental amendments in other states, the public trust clause
says nothing about the need for legislative implementation. If the
legislature, which fashioned Article I, Section 27 in the first place,
had intended the Amendment to require legislative implementa-
tion, it would have written the Amendment that way.92 The
placement of the Amendment in Article I of the state constitution,
along with other historic rights and freedoms, suggests that the
public right to benefit from this trust is also self-executing. 93
Unlike the environmental rights clause, moreover, the public
trust clause imposes an affirmative responsibility on the state. The
word "shall" in a constitutional amendment indicates that the
88. Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976); see also ROBERT E. WOODSIDE,
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 177 (1985) (stating that the public trust part of
Article I, Section 27 is self-executing).
89. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 272. The court did not apply or affirm the commonwealth
court's three-part test. Instead, it simply noted that commonwealth court had fashioned such
a test. See id. at n.23.
90. See Payne 312 A.2d at 94; see also infra note 202 and accompanying text.
91. See Payne, 361 A.2d 263.
92. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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provision is self-executing. 94 The public trust clause provides, in
part, that "the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain" public
natural resources.95 The state has a mandatory duty to protect
public trust resources, regardless of the legislation in existence.
To a large degree, moreover, the public trust clause simply
confirms the state's pre-existing authority to protect public natural
resources. 96 The public trust clause would be superfluous if it
provided less authority than had previously existed or if it implicitly
repealed that authority. This pre-existing authority to protect
public natural resources has two legal sources. One source, as the
supreme court's concurring opinion in Gettysburg Tower explained,
is the historic parens patriae doctrine allowing the state to bring an
action to protect the public's interest in public natural resources.97
Another source is the common law public trust doctrines for
publicly dedicated land and navigable waterways. 98 It is not likely
that the Amendment implicitly repealed prior public trust law in
Pennsylvania. In Payne, in fact, both the commonwealth and
supreme courts expressly considered the public trust law concerning
dedications of public land separately from the public trust law
under Article I, Section 27.99
The public trust clause is also capable of being implemented
without legislation. The trust obligation is surely precise enough to
be self-executing; it is no more imprecise than other constitutional
provisions.1" The historic use of the parens patriae and common
law public trust doctrines strongly supports this conclusion.
The public trust clause is also self-executing because it applies
to public property, not private property. Unlike the Amendment's
first sentence in Gettysburg Tower, the public trust clause does not
directly limit landowners' use of their own land. As the supreme
94. See Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 315-16 (Pa. 1986).
95. See PA. CONST. art I, § 27.
96. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text; see also Jose L. Fernandez, State
Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A
Political Question?, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 376-82 (1993) (legitimacy of judicial
decisions concerning constitutional rights is greater when principles or rules on which those
rights are based are rooted in history or custom).
97. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 595-96
(1973).
98. See infra Section II.B.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 166-171.
100. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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court itself said in Payne, this makes it much easier to conclude
that the public trust clause is self-executing. 1
Under Article I, Section 27, in sum, state trustees have a
constitutional duty to conserve and maintain public natural
resources for public benefit. They lack the constitutional authority
to do otherwise. It is thus irrelevant whether they have the
statutory authority to protect or consider the protection of those
resources.
The need to articulate this point clearly is evident from
Community College of Delaware County v. Fox.1°2 Because the
Fox court did not distinguish the two parts of the Amendment, and
because public trust resources were also at issue,"' its holding
ostensibly applies to the public trust as well as environmental rights
clauses. Fox makes it "virtually impossible for a commonwealth
agency to exercise its power as trustee of the state's public natural
resources."" As already argued, however, the court was not
asked to address the question of whether the Amendment limits
government authority to injure environmental rights; the govern-
ment does not have that authority. Similarly here, the state does
not have the authority to injure public natural resources. In fact,
this result is even more compelling for the public trust clause
because that clause expressly obliges "the Commonwealth," and
thus all agents of the Commonwealth, to conserve and maintain
public natural resources.'0 5 Whatever their authorizing statutes
may say or fail to say, state agencies and municipalities are obliged
to conserve and maintain public natural resources.1°6 They are
also obliged to consider in advance the effects of their decisions on
public natural resources.
B. The Constitutional Public Trust
Because the public trust clause expressly creates a public trust
for public natural resources, it should be understood and analyzed
101. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976). Of course, application of the
public trust doctrine may indirectly affect private property.
102. 342 A.2d 468 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
103. These resources include stream water.
104. Margaret J. Fried & Monique J. Van Damme, Environmental Protection in a
Constitutional Setting, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1369, 1392 (1995).
105. See PA. CONST. art I, § 27. Of course, this obligation is more apparent if the
Amendment is analyzed according to its two parts.
106. Similarly, they lack the authority to interfere with the public rights stated in the first
part of the Amendment.
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in traditional pubic trust terms. Public trust law is based to a great
extent on analogies to, and application of, private or charitable
trust law."°7 Private trust or charitable trust law applies when
property (the corpus or res of the trust) is held or managed by a
trustee for the benefit of its equitable owners, or beneficiaries. 10 8
The trustee's obligations for a particular trust ordinarily are set
forth by the settlor, or person who created the trust.109 The
trustee must adhere to those obligations, although there may be
circumstances under which management of the trust corpus can be
changed. lI
Understanding the public trust clause thus requires identifica-
tion of the settlor, the trust corpus, the beneficiaries, the trustee,
and the trustee's obligations."' These are also the categories that
have informed the application of the common law public trust in
Pennsylvania for publicly dedicated land and navigable waters. 12
Because the Amendment builds on these common law public trust
doctrines, it makes sense to interpret the constitutional public trust
using the same categories.
107. See, e.g., Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967) (federal land granted to states for
school purposes subject to same principles as those governing private trusts); Hill v.
Thompson, 564 So.2d 1 (Miss. 1989) (common law rules of private trust applied to public
school lands trust); State v. Hale, 573 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ohio 1991) (public official entrusted
with public money is trustee of public trust fund with same level of responsibility as trustee
of private trust fund).
108. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 25, 37 (6th ed. 1987).
109. See id. § 102(a) (but recognizing that the trustee's duty may also be controlled by
court order, conduct of the beneficiary, or statute). The trustee's specific duties under public
and private trusts are not necessarily the same, however. For private and charitable trusts,
a basic duty of the trustee is to make trust property economically productive. See id. § 101.
But see Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999) (although many basic principles of
private trust law apply to public land trusts, some private trust law principles, such as duty
to maximize economic yield from trust property, are inconsistent with constitutional terms
of public trust for natural resources).
110. See BOGERT, supra note 108, § 146 (permitting court alteration of private trust
provisions when necessary or highly convenient to accomplish settlor's purposes, and
circumstances arise that were not known to or anticipated by settlor), & § 147 (permitting
court to order trust funds to be directed to different charitable purpose than directed by
settlor, when settlor had general intent to benefit charity but "accomplishment of settlor's
purpose is or becomes impossible, impractical or inexpedient").
111. See ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 994 (2d ed. 1998).
112. See, e.g., Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1999) (navigable stream is "owned by the Commonwealth for the public trust"); In re 1.2
Acres of Bangor Memorial Park, 567 A.2d 750, 752 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (land dedicated
for public parks is governed by public trust doctrine).
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1. Settlors.-The settlors for publicly dedicated land are
ordinarily individuals or governments who dedicate particular
parcels for public use, or whose offer of dedication is accepted by
a governmental entity.'13 These persons are actually settlors in
the private trust sense, because they established or initiated the
trusts in question."l 4
The settlors for the Article I, Section 27 public trust were
Pennsylvania's people and the General Assembly.'15 This is
consistent with the standard constitutional process for the adoption
of such provisions.
2. Trust Corpus. -The trust corpus, or subject of the trust for
public land that has been dedicated for public use, depends on the
terms of the specific dedication. Ordinarily, the trust corpus in an
environmental setting is a public commons, public park, or similar
parcel." 6 The trust corpus for the navigable waters doctrine
includes the water and bed of navigable waters up to the high
water mark." 7 Navigable waters are those that are both naviga-
113. See, e.g., Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649, 650 (Pa. 1950) (dedication by
original owner); Borough of Ridgway v. Grant, 425 A.2d 1168, 1169 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)
(grant by three persons accepted by municipality).
114. For navigable waters, the analogy to settlors is more difficult. The public trust
doctrine for such waters is based largely on a Pennsylvania common law adaptation of
English trust law. See, e.g., Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 489-95 (Pa. 1810) (holding that the
state owns the land underlying Susquehanna River, and that private owner of land along the
bank of the river thus lacks exclusive right to fish immediately in front of his land). The
court thus rejected the contrary English rule that fresh water rivers where the tides do not
ebb and blow belong to the bank owners. See Fulmer v. Williams, 15 A. 726, 727 (Pa. 1888)
(explaining that English rule was not adopted because it was unsuited to the country's "large
rivers with navigable tributaries, forming vast systems of internal communication, extending
hundreds and in some instances thousands of miles above the reach of tide-water"). The
courts, in a sense, are the settlors for public trust law concerning navigable waters.
115. The constitutional status of this public trust doctrine means that courts do not need
to play a leading role in extending the common law public trust to other resources or in
providing protections that common law doctrines do not now provide. It also answers, at
least for Pennsylvania, persistent questions about the legitimacy of public trust law. See
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 710-13 (1986) (raising questions
about judicial activism and the limited historical basis of public trust law).
116. See, e.g., Hoffman, 75 A.2d 649 ("public square"); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney
General v. Burgess, 50 A. 825 (Pa. 1902) ("public ground"); Borough of Ridgway, 425 A.2d
1168 ("public municipal park"). It is also possible to dedicate land for streets or highways,
but such dedications do not ordinarily have an environmental purpose.
117. See e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 163 A. 297, 300
(Pa. 1932); Fulmer, 15 A. at 727.
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ble in fact and "susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce." '
The trust corpus for Article I, Section 27 is "Pennsylvania's
public natural resources."' 19 The Amendment's legislative history
indicates that the public trust clause applies to natural resources
that are publicly owned or are subject to a pre-existing common
law public trust; it does not apply to "purely private property
rights.
120
Even with the exception of private property, the scope of the
public trust is quite broad. It includes virtually all natural resources
that are subject to a common law trust, and a great deal more.
These public natural resources include ambient air as well as
surface and ground water that has not been privately appropriat-
ed. 1  Public natural resources also include wild animals and fish
that have not been captured or killed," and especially threatened
118. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 176 A. 7, 9 (Pa. 1935).
Because many lakes are navigable in fact but not susceptible of being used for commerce,
they are not considered navigable. See Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486, 488-90
(Pa. 1959); see also Commonwealth v. Foster, 36 Pa. Super. 433 (1908) (stream that is not
navigable cannot be made so by legislative declaration).
119. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
120. Robert Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environmental Rights,
Analysis of HB 958, 41 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 421, 426-27 (1970). Nor does it appear to create
private property rights. In Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa.
1995), the supreme court held that Article I, Section 27 does not provide a liberty or
property interest to an individual to conduct recreational hunting because the amendment
requires the state to "conserve and maintain the natural resources and public estate for the
benefit of all the people."
121. Broughton, supra note 120, at 425. The state has more than 80,000 miles of rivers
and streams. See REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION, supra note 72, at 29. Because
a landowner does not have an absolute right to the groundwater under his or her property,
groundwater is probably a public natural resource under the second part of the Amendment.
Under common law, groundwater withdrawals are permitted to the extent they do not
unreasonably interfere with the supply of water drawn from wells on nearby property. See
Hatfield Township v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 168 A.2d 333 (Pa. 1961) (citing Rothrauff v.
Sinking Spring Water Co., 14 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1940)). It is thus possible to use groundwater that
underlies the property of another, particularly if there are no wells on the other property or
if little water is drawn from wells on that property.
122. See 34 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 103(a) (West 1997) (vesting "ownership, jurisdiction
over and control of game or wildlife" in Pennsylvania Game Commission); see also id.
§ 2304(a) (stating that the "carcass of game or wildlife lawfully killed or taken shall be the
property of the person who inflicts a mortal wound which enables that person to take
possession of the carcass"). See Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253 (1995)
(assuming that sea ducks whose hunting is regulated by Game Commission are covered by
Article I, Section 27); see also 30 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a) & (b) (stating that the
"proprietary ownership, jurisdiction, and control of fish, living free in nature, are vested in
this Commonwealth," and identifying Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission as state
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or endangered species."' In addition, these public natural
resources include the area between ordinary high and low water
marks of a navigable river or water body.124 The state owns the
land under such waters, too. t25 Public natural resources also
encompass government owned natural resources, including almost
4.5 million acres in state parks, forests, game lands, and other
public lands used for environmental purposes. 126  They also
include land that has been publicly dedicated for a public park or
similar common use.'27 In addition, public natural resources
include the trees, plants, and minerals on public property.1
28
agency "authorized to regulate, control, manage and perpetuate fish"). The definition of fish
"includes all game fish, fish bait, bait fish, amphibians, reptiles and aquatic organisms." Id.
at § 102. Persons with a valid license are permitted to keep fish that meet certain
regulations. See 58 PA. CODE §§ 61, 63 (1998). Before Article I, Section 27 was adopted,
the superior court held that, while "the state has power to preserve and control" fish for "the
enjoyment of all citizens," the state did not own the fish. Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 232
A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). But see Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265,
284 (1977):
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game
preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals.
Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful
fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to
possession by skillful capture.
See also Potts v. Davis, 610 A.2d 74, 75 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (citing Douglas and
suggesting that ownership claim in section 103(a) of the Game Code is merely a nineteenth
century legal fiction expressing the importance of state's interest in protecting wildlife, but
not referring to Article I, Section 27).
123. See PENNSYLVANIA BIOLOGICAL SURVEY, INVENTORY AND MONITORING OF
BIOTIC RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA 85-200 (1998) (describing threatened and endangered
mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles, fishes, and invertebrates).
124. See e.g., Freeland v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 47 A. 745 (Pa. 1901) (stating that
this area is subject to the public rights of navigation, fishing, and improvement of the
stream). Navigable waters include those subject to tides as well as rivers capable of being
navigated, or "navigable in the common sense of the term." Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v.
Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909); see also Ball v. Slack, 2 Whart. 508, 538 (Pa. 1837).
125. See Paasch v. Wright, 177 A. 795, 796 (Pa. 1935) (lands underlying navigable waters
are owned in trust by the Commonwealth).
126. See REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION, supra note 72, at 29. Such lands are
unquestionably public natural resources. Not all state-owned land would qualify as a public
natural resource, however.
127. See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). Because much
dedicated land is used for environmental or recreational purposes, it would qualify as a
public natural resource. Land that is dedicated for other purposes and used in other ways
(e.g., highways) would not qualify as a public natural resource.
128. Broughton, supra note 120, at 426; see also INVENTORY AND MONITORING OF
BIOTIC RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 123, at 23-82 (describing threatened or
endangered vascular plants, fungi, briophytes, and lichens). To the extent such species exist
on public lands, of course, they are part of the public's natural resources.
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While the drafters did not wish to immediately change the
existing boundary between public and private property, they also
did not wish to permanently freeze that boundary. When the
Amendment was debated in the legislature, it originally contained
a list of protected resources--"air, waters, fish, wildlife, and the
public lands and property of the Commonwealth.', 29  There was
concern that listing the specific resources subject to the public trust
might freeze the public trust corpus.131 As a result, the list was
removed.13 ' While there was no evident objection to the listed
subjects, at least insofar as they are public resources, the drafters
wanted to authorize the continuing development of public trust law,
including its application to public resources not previously recog-
nized as such. The Amendment's supporters observed that neither
public trust resources nor private property are legally fixed. 32
Previously recognized forms of private property have disappeared,
and future public property rights, perhaps relating to ecological
diversity, might someday be recognized.133 The final language
neither requires nor prohibits further changes in the boundary
between public natural resources and private property rights.
134
Of equal importance to the scope of "public natural resources"
is the statement in Article I, Section 27 that these resources are the
"common property of all the people." Use of the term "property"
is extremely important, because it means that the state (like a
private trustee) has legal title to the trust corpus. Since the state
does not have to prove ownership, it is in a stronger position to
protect public trust resources than many other states. 35  Indeed,
129. See H.B. 958, 153d Leg., 2nd Sess. (Pa. 1969) (Printer's No. 1105); see also Brough-
ton, supra note 120, at 424.
130. "The introducing word, 'including,' would not ordinarily be so interpreted, but a list
always presents some danger that a court may sometime use the list to limit, rather than
expand, a basic concept." Broughton, supra note 120, at 425.
131. Compare H.B. 958, 153d Leg., 2nd Sess. (Pa. 1969) (Printer's No. 2860) with H.B.
958 (Printer's No. 1105).
132. Broughton, supra note 120, at 425-26.
133. "At one time, for example, an advowson, a right to appoint a clerk at a church, was
a real property right, inheritable by heirs, and the subject of real property actions. Today,
an advowson is strictly an historical curiosity." Brougton, supra note 120, at 425 (citation
omitted).
134. See id. at 426. Restrictions on the use of public natural resources do, of course,
indirectly affect uses of private property.
135. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188 (1980) ("The central idea of the public trust is preventing
the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal
recognition such as title.").
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the constitutional declaration of public ownership is reflected in fish
and game statutes enacted since its passage that specifically claim
public ownership of such resources.'36
3. Beneficiaries. -Both common law public trust doctrines
have the general public as their beneficiaries. Publicly dedicated
land is to be held "for the benefit of the public," including people
living near or using the lands in question.37 The right to use
navigable waters generally is "open to all."' 38
Similarly, Article I, Section 27 states that the Commonwealth
is to conserve and maintain the state's public natural resources "for
the benefit of all the people." The people are beneficiaries of the
trust, 139 and thus have certain rights to have the trust managed
appropriately. The common law public trust cases indicate that
beneficiaries can assert their rights under the trust by bringing an
action against the trustee for failure to comply with the trustee's
obligations.1" It follows that public beneficiaries of the constitu-
tional trust can also bring an action against the trustee for failure
to comply with its obligations.
136. See supra note 122.
137. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 3382 (West 1997); Bruker v. Burgess and Town Council
of Borough of Carlisle, 102 A.2d 418, 419-20 (Pa. 1954) (plaintiffs are citizens and taxpayers
who are also vendors or customers in public market); Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d
649, 651 (Pa. 1950) (plaintiffs held to have standing because they own lots fronting on public
square).
These cases tend not to distinguish between the beneficiary class as a whole and those
who have standing to sue. Plainly, these plaintiffs are members of the beneficiary class. But
the beneficiaries of a public square or public market also include others who, for example,
own property that does not front on the square or market. These other beneficiaries may
also be plaintiffs. See Board of Trustees of Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of University
of Pennsylvania, 96 A. 123, 125 (Pa. 1915) (holding that taxpayers were properly allowed to
intervene as plaintiffs to challenge change in use of publicly dedicated land because they
were part of public to whom property was dedicated and because tax money had been used
to improve the property).
138. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475,495 (Pa. 1810) (right to fish navigable waters); see also
City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 163 A. 297, 300 (Pa. 1932) (Schuyl-
kill River is navigable, and title to its bed and waters is thus "held by the state for the
benefit of the public"); Citizens' Electric Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 113 A. 559, 561 (Pa.
1921) (Susquehanna River is a "public highway for the use of the citizens of the common-
wealth").
139. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976) (referring to appellants as
beneficiaries of public trust created by Article I, Section 27).
140. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, 96 A. 123,125
(Pa. 1900). Violation of the trust terms is also a public nuisance, and can be challenged as
such. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Epping-Carpenter Co., 45 A. 129, 133 (Pa. 1900)
(occupation of publicly dedicated property inconsistent with public right is public nuisance).
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Plaintiffs or appellants challenging a government action under
the constitutional public trust will thus need to show that the
resource being affected is part of the "public natural resources" of
the state. Because cases decided under the Payne test have not
distinguished between the different types of resources and values
protected by each part of the Amendment, this requirement would
be new.
Plaintiffs or appellants will also likely need to show that they
are sufficiently affected by a particular action or proposed action
to meet the state's standing rules.'41 Because all of Pennsylva-
nia's citizens are the beneficiaries, there may be a problem showing
that individuals or organizations are adversely affected in a way
that is different from all other members of the public.'42 As a
result, named beneficiaries should ordinarily be persons who are
particularly affected by the action (or inaction) they are challeng-
ing. Pennsylvania law, however, permits taxpayers to bring an
action against the state if it appears that their grievance might
otherwise not be judicially redressible.'43 Similarly here, where
an action or inaction affecting the public trust is felt statewide,
beneficiaries of the public trust should be able to bring an action.
4. Trustees.-As is ordinarily the case with public trust law,
the trustees for publicly dedicated land and navigable waters are
governmental entities. For publicly dedicated land, the trustee is
ordinarily a municipality or the state." For navigable waters, the
trustee is the state.
145
141. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
142. Ordinarily, plaintiffs need to show that their interest is substantial, direct, and
immediate. See id.
143. See Consumer Party v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 329 (Pa. 1986); Application
of Biester, 409 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. 1979).
144. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3382 (West 1997) (all lands or buildings donated to
political subdivision for use as public facility, or dedicated or offered for dedication for public
use, "shall be deemed to be held by such political subdivision, as trustee, for the benefit of
the public with full legal title in the said trustee."). Land or buildings may also be donated
to the state, in which case the state would be the trustee. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 1340.303(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999-2000) (authorizing Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources to receive land for state parks by gift, subject to encumbrances not
inconsistent with use for parks). These encumbrances may include ownership of the land in
trust.
145. See City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 163 A. 297, 300 (Pa.
1932); Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 28 Serg. & Rawle 71, 80-81 (1826) ("entire right
to the soil and water" of navigable waters are "vested in the state, for the benefit of the
public").
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Under Article I, Section 27, "the Commonwealth" is expressly
made "trustee."''146 This language does not indicate whether the
governor, the attorney general, the legislature, the courts, or a
combination of these, is the trustee.147 In reality, the trusteeship
responsibility is divided among all of them. The cases decided
under the Amendment make it clear that the executive branch has
some responsibilities to carry out Article I, Section 27, that
legislation can effectively implement the Amendment, and that the
Attorney General has the authority to file an action to vindicate
the rights protected by the Amendment. The courts are also
trustees, although they have a different role to play. In a 1986 case
involving constitutional challenges to convictions for the illegal
transportation of solid waste, the supreme court recognized that the
courts have a trusteeship responsibility under the Amendment.
148
In rejecting those challenges, the court reasoned that the "courts of
this Commonwealth, as part of a co-equal branch of government,
serve as 'trustees' of 'Pennsylvania's public natural resources,' no
less than do the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment.', 149  As a result, the court explained, "we share the duty
and obligation to protect and foster the environmental well-being
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.' 50
All agencies in the executive branch whose actions can affect
public natural resources have a trusteeship responsibility under
Article I, Section 27. The governor, of course, is ultimately
responsible for seeing that the state's laws are faithfully execut-
ed.15' Article I, Section 27, as part of the state constitution,
plainly falls within that responsibility. A variety of agencies have
statutory responsibilities concerning environmental matters, but
none has the lead or primary responsibility for implementing
Article I, Section 27.152 While some agencies, such as the Depart-
146. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
147. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 593 (Pa.
1973).
148. See Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986).
149. Id. at 1370.
150. Id. The court's conclusion was supported by language in the challenged statute that
specifically stated the statute was intended to implement Article I, Section 27. See id.
151. See PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
152. Until 1995, the Department of Environmental Resources was the pre-eminent state
environmental agency, with responsibilities for pollution control as well as the management
of state forests and parks. Even though the Department was the obvious lead among
executive agencies, however, the commonwealth court held that the Department did not have
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ment of Environmental Protection and the Department of Conser-
vation and Natural Resources, plainly are covered by this public
trust responsibility, any other executive agency that can affect
public natural resources is also included.153 Because municipali-
ties are subdivisions of the state, they are trustees to the extent that
their decisions affect public natural resources. 54
Ordinarily, some state or local governmental entity will be the
defendant or appellee in a constitutional public trust case. Still, the
possibility exists that a private party could be challenged for
adversely affecting public trust property. In common law cases
involving navigable waters, plaintiffs have claimed that such a party
is causing a public nuisance. 155 Whenever a private party is the
target of a lawsuit or appeal in which a violation of the constitu-
tional public trust is charged, it would probably be necessary for
the relevant governmental entity to be joined as an indispensable
party.
5. Responsibilities of Trustees.
a. Common Law Framework. -Trustee responsibilities are
understood in two ways in public trust law, including the common
law Pennsylvania doctrines that preceded Article I, section 27. The
trustee has an overall responsibility to manage the trust corpus in
a certain way. The basic trust management responsibilities define
the obligations of the trustee on a day-to-day basis, provide a
standard against which the trustee's actions can be evaluated, and
thus represent the primary duties of the trustee. Changes in the
use of trust resources are permissible if they are within the terms
of the trust. Yet there may be circumstances under which it is
necessary or appropriate to change the uses of trust resources in a
manner that is outside the general terms of the trust. To protect
the integrity of the trust, however, changes inconsistent with the
primary responsibility for implementing the Amendment. See Bruhin v. Commonwealth, 320
A.2d 907 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
153. While this analysis is similar to that for the environmental rights part of the Amend-
ment, agency responsibilities under each part of Article I, Section 27 will depend on the
different scope of each.
154. See Community College of Delaware County v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 481-82 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975).
155. See City of Pittsburgh v. Epping-Carpenter Co., 45 A. 129, 133 (Pa. 1900).
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overall trust terms should be permitted rarely, if at all.156 When
a use of trust property is challenged, then, a court must first
determine the government's substantive responsibilities under the
terms of the trust. The court must then decide whether the
proposed use is consistent with those terms. If not, the court must
decide whether this is one of those exceptional cases in which it is
appropriate to allow a use that is not consistent with the trust
terms.
For publicly dedicated land, the overall responsibilities of the
trustee vary with the terms of the dedication.157 The land, howev-
er, must be managed in a manner that is consistent with, and does
not interfere with, the terms of the dedication.158 By ensuring
adherence to the terms of the dedication, courts protect the
interests of both present and future users of the land,159 even
though future uses under the dedication may not be the same as
present uses.16°
156. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (explaining judicial reluctance to permit
changes in use of public trust resources that are inconsistent with trust terms as essential to
effectiveness of public trust doctrine). The principal case cited by Professor Sax, Illinois
Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), illustrates the importance of judicial
decisions requiring adherence to the overall trust terms. In that case, Illinois held title to the
lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan "in trust for the people of the State that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty
of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties." Illinois
Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892). In 1869, the Illinois legislature granted
the railroad nearly all of the submerged lands in Chicago harbor, about 1,000 acres in total.
See id. at 448-51, 454. The Supreme Court held the legislative action to be invalid because
it "is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State
to preserve such waters for the use of the public." Id. at 453.
157. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3382 (West 1997) (describing such lands as
"held ... for the benefit of the public with full legal title" in the municipality as trustee).
158. Compare Mahon v. Luzerne County, 46 A. 894 (Pa. 1900) (erection of public
building on land dedicated broadly as public square is consistent with dedication) with
Borough of Ridgway v. Grant, 425 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (placement of fire
engine house on land dedicated as public park is inconsistent with use of land as public
park).
159. See Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 1950) ("[F]uture City
fathers may feel that human values-air, light, rest, recreation and health which can be
derived from any public square-are more important and valuable to the citizens of
Pittsburgh than the increased revenue which will likely be produced by a sale of this public
property.").
160. See Bruker v. Burgess of Borough of Carlisle, 102 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1954) ("When-
ever property is dedicated in merely general terms to public use such use necessarily varies
with the changing circumstances, customs and requirements of city life .... ).
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If the proposed change in use is not consistent with the terms
of the dedication, the next question is whether the type of change,
or the circumstances of the change, render the proposed change
appropriate nonetheless. The rules governing this question are
extremely protective of the original dedication. A different use is
permitted when the original trust purpose "is no longer practicable
or possible" and "has ceased to serve the public interest.', 161 As
long as the property is being used for the original trust purpose,
this is a difficult test to meet. 62 Thus, dedicated land cannot in
general be sold for private use, even if the proceeds will be used
for public purposes.163  Land that is dedicated for one public
purpose cannot even be used for a different public purpose.164
Nor can the public right in land subject to such a public trust be
extinguished by adverse possession.
165
Significantly, the court in Payne also addressed the question of
whether the common law rules concerning publicly dedicated land
were violated by the use of part of the public commons for a street-
widening project." 6 Early in the nineteenth century, the legisla-
ture dedicated the land on which the park was located as a public
commons.167  The land had been used as a public park since that
161. PA. STAT. ANN. 53, § 3384 (West 1997). When that occurs, the trustee may
substitute other property to carry out the trust purposes, sell the property and apply the
proceeds to carry out the trust purposes, or, if the original trust purposes are no longer in
the public interest, apply the proceeds to a different public purpose. See id.
162. See, e.g., Trustees of the Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of the University of
Pennsylvania, 96 A. 123, 126 (Pa. 1915) (limiting city's ability to alienate dedicated property
"[s]o long at least as the property and buildings occupied by the museums continue to be
used for that purpose in good faith").
163. See, e.g., Hoffman, 75 A.2d at 654; In re Conveyance of 1.2 Acres of Bangor
Memorial Park, 4 Pa. D. & C. 4th 343 (Pa. Com. PI. 1988) aff'd, 567 A.2d 750 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1989). In Payne v. Kassab, the supreme court stated that the "diversion of dedicated
land from one public use to another may be approved in a proper case," but cited cases in
which the new public use was consistent with the dedicatory language. See Payne v. Kassab,
361 A.2d 263, 269 (Pa. 1976) (citing, e.g., Shields v. Philadelphia, 176 A.2d 697 (Pa. 1962)
(allowing portion of park to be used as Little League baseball field when dedication stated
that "no buildings shall be erected thereon other than those required for the comfort of the
people, and also that the garden and greens shall be preserved as far as possible"); Bernstein
v. Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1951) (allowing portion of park to be used for open air
auditorium when dedication called for "place of free, attractive and healthful resort, and
open air recreation ... and for no other purpose whatever")).
164. See Borough of Ridgway v. Grant, 425 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
165. Cf. Lacy v. Montgomery, 124 A.2d 492, 497-98 (Pa. 1956) (public highway).
166. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
167. See id. at 88, 90.
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time, as well as for a variety of festivals, civic programs, and
educational and recreational purposes.168
The commonwealth court held that this land was not being
taken for private use, that the street widening project would not
alter the charter and nature of the commons, and that it was
"merely a diversion of a minimal quantum of public land from one
public purpose to another public purpose."' 69 The supreme court
affirmed, using essentially the same reasoning, but adding that the
dedicatory language only referred to a public commons without
specifying acceptable uses in greater detail. 7°  A dissenting
opinion argued that use of the land as a road was not consistent
with its original dedication as a public commons. 7'
The common law public trust rules concerning public rights in
navigable waterways also state the trustee's overall responsibility
and define the circumstances under which uses of navigable
waterways can be changed. The state holds the bed and waters of
navigable waters for public benefit, including navigation, fishing,
domestic consumption, and other uses. 72 Unlike public dedica-
tions, where the terms of the dedication differ from parcel to parcel
based on the wishes of those dedicating the land, the terms of this
trust are based on common law, and do not generally differ from
one navigable water body to another. Riparian owners have no
exclusive right to these uses and may not interfere with them.
173
Also unlike public dedications, there do not appear to be
situations under which the basic terms of the government's trust
responsibility can be changed. It is difficult to conceive of a
situation under which public use of the water or bed of navigable
waters would be "no longer practicable or possible," and have
"ceased to serve the public interest."
168. See id. at 91-92.
169. Id. at 96.
170. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 268-69 (Pa. 1976).
171. See id. at 273-74 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion also disputed the
conclusion that use of the half-acre as a public road is de minimis. See id. at 274.
172. See Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 14 Serg. & R. 71, 80-81 (Pa. 1826) (rivers);
Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909) (lakes). The bed under
nonnavigable waters is owned by the riparian owners, but such waters are still subject to a
public easement for navigation when navigation is possible. See Barclay R.R. & Coal Co.
v. Ingham, 36 Pa. 194, 200-02 (1860).
173. At the same time, these public rights do not mean that the public may trespass on
private lands to enjoy them. See, e.g., Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 200 A.
646, 650 (Pa. 1938).
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Private uses of public trust resources are permissible, but are
subject to the overriding rule that these uses may not interfere with
public rights. Thus, people may take fish from navigable wa-
ters, 7 4 subject to state regulations to ensure the continuing
availability of fish over time.175 Municipalities and others may
withdraw water for their own use, again subject to a state regulato-
ry system designed to prevent the removal of so much water as to
interfere with public rights. 76 Riparian owners may also use the
land along navigable waters between the high and low water marks
so long as these uses do not substantially interfere with navigation
or other public rights. 177 The state can grant land that lies below
navigable waters to private interests if it first finds that the grant is
consistent with the public interest, but the grant is revocable if the
use of granted land is inconsistent with the public interest. 78 The
right to pollute navigable or nonnavigable waters cannot be
acquired by prescription. 79
b. Constitutional Framework.- As these two public trust
doctrines indicate, the starting point for a trust analysis is the terms
of the trust itself. While changes in the use consistent with the
trust terms are generally permissible, changes that are inconsistent
with the trust terms generally are not permissible. This analytical
174. See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 494-95 (Pa. 1810).
175. See 30 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102 (West 1997) (authorizing adoption of regula-
tions concerning "protection, preservation and management of fish and fish habitat").
176. See City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 163 A. 297 (Pa. 1932);
see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 631-41 (West 1997) (statute governing acquisition of water
rights in surface waters by public water supply agencies); Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (stating that "few public interests are more obvious,
indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a state
to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of turning
them to a more perfect use.").
Withdrawals by riparian owners are generally limited to those necessary for the use
of riparian land for ordinary purposes. See Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Delaware, L. &
W. R.R. Co., 88 A. 24 (Pa. 1913).
177. See Commonwealth v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 32 A. 121 (Pa. 1895); Fulmer
v. Williams, 15 A. 726 (Pa. 1888).
178. See Title 32, § 675 (declaring void any "right, grant or privilege heretofore or
hereafter granted or given, by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in the bed of any
navigable waters within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth . .. whenever the same
becomes or is deemed derogatory or inimical to the public interest, or fails to serve the best
interests of the Commonwealth").
179. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 126 A. 386, 391 (Pa. 1924); Clearview
Land Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth, 327 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
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structure for public trust decision-making is both appropriate and
necessary for the Amendment's public trust clause.
The public trust clause expressly imposes three separate but
related responsibilities on state trustees. To begin with, the
Commonwealth is to "conserve and maintain" public natural
resources.18° The 1993 Conservation and Natural Resources Act
expressly recognizes this responsibility for the overall management
of public natural resources.181 Changes in the use of public
natural resources are permissible so long as these resources are
conserved and maintained. Nothing in the Amendment's text
freezes existing uses, and the inevitability of changes in use was
recognized during the legislative process that prepared the
Amendment for public referendum."s  On the other hand,
degradation of public natural resources or diminution in their
quality would likely be inconsistent with the obligation to conserve
and maintain them.
Second, the Commonwealth must manage these resources "for
the benefit of all the people." '83  Access to and distribution of
these resources are thus equal in importance to environmental
quality. Inequitable public access to public natural resources,
inequitable distribution of those resources, and state decisions that
give priority to private profit-making uses over public uses, are
generally limited by the public trust clause. Public natural
resources, after all, are to benefit "all of the people."1" Quite
plainly, access restrictions to protect such resources (e.g., limits on
the number and size of fish that may be taken) are appropriate
because they are applied to all. When the state allows a particular
company to use a length of stream on an indefinite basis, however,
and in so doing prevents others from fishing, boating, swimming or
otherwise using the stream, the state has almost certainly violated
the public trust clause.
Finally, the public trust clause requires the state to maintain
public ownership of public natural resources.185 It does so by
180. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
181. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1340.101(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998-99).
182. See Part I, supra note 1, at 704.
183. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
184. Id. Thus, for example, at least one state park is located within 25 miles of each
Pennsylvania citizen. See REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION, supra note 72, at 36.
185. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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making these resources the common property "of all the peo-
ple." 186 In general, the government cannot convey public natural
resources to private parties or allow their permanent or semi-
permanent conversion to private use."l Pennsylvania's pre-
existing public trust law generally forbids such conversion."
Publicly dedicated land cannot be sold to private parties; the bed
of navigable waters is subject to public ownership."9 Because the
public trust clause builds on the state's experience with these rules,
it follows that public natural resources should be protected in the
same manner. Of course, private consumptive uses of public
natural resources for fishing, hunting, water withdrawals, and other
purposes are not prohibited by the constitutional trust unless they
interfere with the conservation and maintenance of those resources.
The permanent or semi-permanent conversion of public natural
resources to private use, however, deprives the public of access to
these resources, and is thus prohibited."9
The conversion of public natural resources from one public
owner to another probably does not, by itself, violate the public
trust clause. Such a conversion might violate the Amendment,
however, if it was inconsistent with conservation and maintenance
of resources or with their public availability.
Each of these three obligations applies, by the terms of the
public trust clause, to both present and future generations. The
state's obligation to conserve and maintain public natural resources
for future generations means that the state must ensure that these
resources are of at least the same quality and diversity for future
generations as they are for the present generation. In this way, the
state is to maximize the options available to future generations.19'
186. Id.
187. Cf. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. 1995)
(Amendment cannot be used to justify private property claims in the values or resources it
identifies).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 163, 173, and 178.
189. See id.
190. Leases of state-owned forest land for logging were anticipated during the legislative
process that produced the Amendment. See Part I, supra note 1, at 704. However, a lease
could be of such a long duration, and involve such preclusion of other uses, as to violate the
public trust clause.
In general, nothing in the public trust clause would prevent the state from transferring
natural resource lands to private parties if the state received equivalent or higher quality
lands in return.
191. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 38-43 (1989).
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The state's duty to ensure public access to, and fair distribution of,
public natural resources also applies to future generations. Thus,
among other things, the government may not permit or allow uses
of public natural resources that will cause long-term or irreversible
adverse impacts on those resources, even if the present impact of
those uses is minimal. 92 Finally, the obligation to maintain public
ownership of public natural resources necessarily protects future
generations from a variety of leasing and other arrangements that
could attenuate public ownership of those resources over time.
In fact, the obligation to conserve and maintain public natural
resources for the benefit of future generations probably means that
the state is required to restore degraded resources and plan for the
enhancement of other public natural resources. This obligation is
specifically important where these resources have been degraded by
past human activity. More generally, it is necessary because natural
conditions fluctuate with human activity, weather and climate, and
other variables. 193  Because the condition of public natural
resources is constantly changing, it is impossible to simply maintain
them at some fixed condition. Rather, the state needs to aim at
enhancing their quality and integrity to ensure that they are
conserved and maintained, particularly for future generations.
Before the government makes a decision that may affect public
natural resources, it needs to consider these obligations.94 To do
so, of course, it also needs to have sufficient information. 195  It
thus behooves the state to develop that information on its own, or
to request it from the applicant or project proponent, and oblige
192. See id.
193. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National
Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 71-72 (1998).
194. See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based
Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 438-48 (1997) (public trust amendments to
state constitutions should be read to require governmental consideration of public trust
resources in decision making). Because both the public trust doctrines in Pennsylvania and
the public trust clause have historically imposed substantive responsibilities on governmental
trustees, and because courts can supervise the exercise of these responsibilities without
second guessing technical or policy issues, the procedural obligation (to consider and develop
information concerning compliance with substantive trustee responsibilities) is in addition to
(not in lieu of) the trustees' substantive duties. Indeed, the government's obligation to
develop information and consider how it will comply with its substantive responsibilities
should facilitate any judicial review that may occur.
195. See John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous
Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1997) (information concerning pollution).
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such persons to demonstrate that the proposal is consistent with the
state's obligation to conserve and maintain these resources.
The public trust clause could thus be used to challenge a
governmental decision involving public natural resources. Because
the clause imposes specific mandatory duties on governmental
trustees, though, it could also be used in a mandamus action where
the ostensibly responsible governmental entity has not acted.
The generality of the state's public trust obligations under
Article I, Section 27 means that the state has a great deal of
flexibility in carrying out its responsibilities. This approach would
not necessarily change in significant ways the manner in which
many basic government functions are already being carried out.
The state's regulatory authority under The Clean Streams Law and
the Air Pollution Control Act,196 for example, covers many, but
not all, of the issues identified by the constitutional text. Where
protection of public natural resources has been considered by a
government agency with statutory authority for protection of public
natural resources, and where the resolution of factual questions
requires technical expertise, courts should defer to agency expertise
on those factual questions. A basic purpose of the Amendment,
after all, is not to second guess technical decisions, but rather to fill
gaps created by the absence of statutory or regulatory authori-
ty.197 It is thus likely that the direct application of the Amend-
ment to such permits would not dramatically change the permitting
process. However, if a particular matter was not specifically
considered, or if the agency's decision plainly does not comply with
the public trust clause, then deference would be inappropriate. In
such ways, the Amendment would fill legislative and administrative
gaps that need to be filled if public natural resources are to be
accorded necessary protection under the constitution.
198
The Amendment contains no language allowing the use of
public natural resources for any purposes other than those stated
196. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-1001 (West 1993) (clean streams); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 4001-4106 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (air pollution).
197. Equitable access to public natural resources and the conversion of public natural
resources to private ownership, moreover, do not even involve scientific or technical issues.
198. It can even be argued that the use of public natural resources for the private
discharge of pollutants constitutionally requires the payment of a fee. Private users of public
natural resources pay fees to camp in state parks, fish, hunt, trap, dredge in navigable waters,
boat in navigable waters, and cut state forests for timber. If anything, pollution of public
natural resources is more intrusive than many of these uses. By charging a fee for all such
permits, moreover, the state would encourage reductions in pollution.
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in the public trust clause. The New York and Massachusetts
constitutions, by contrast, expressly permit the use of public natural
resources for other purposes under specific circumstances.' The
absence of such language in a constitutional provision does not
necessarily preclude the judicial creation of limited exceptions, but
it does indicate the primacy of the trustees' overall obligations.2"
This conclusion is consistent with public trust law, which recognizes
the paramount importance of the trustees' obligations under the
trust.
c. Eliminating the Payne Test but Not Overruling the Phyne
Decision.-In Payne v. Kassab, the commonwealth court created a
three-part test to determine compliance with Article I, Section 27,
and especially its public trust clause.20 1  This test, but not the
court's overall holding, should be set aside.
Under the Payne test, a governmental decision is subject to
three questions:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's
public natural resources? (2) Does the record demonstrate a
reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a
minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm which will result
199. See MASS. CONsT. art. XCVII (permitting land to be used in a manner inconsistent
with overall trust obligations if approved by a two-thirds vote in each house of the
legislature); N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (permitting certain lands to be used in a manner
inconsistent with overall constitutional obligations).
200. Formulating such an exception is inappropriate here for several reasons. Most
basically, the methodical development of constitutional law requires exceptions to grow out
of the facts of particular cases. To suggest the existence of specific exceptions in advance
is premature. This is particularly true because the public trust clause imposes relatively
general requirements that, if allowed to operate as they were intended, would not unduly
restrict state agencies and municipalities. Second, and of almost equal importance, the desire
for exceptions to environmental protection rules grows to a great extent from an assumption
that is simply impossible to fully protect environmental resources. Pennsylvania's experience
with environmental protection over the past three decades, however, demonstrates that it is
possible to reconcile environmental protection with economic development. See Part I, supra
note 1, at 720-21. It is unnecessary and inappropriate, not to mention prejudicial to future
generations, to manage those resources on a "damage control" basis. Third, exceptions
(including balancing rules) would inevitably compromise the state's constitutional obligation
to manage the public trust in specific ways, and would be understood by governmental
trustees as prior legal approval to dispose of public natural resources in ways not authorized
by the constitutional text. If there are eventually to be exceptions, they should be so few in
number and so limited in scope that the trustees could not possibly mistake the exceptions
for the general rule.
201. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
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from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the
benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would
be an abuse of discretion?'
The Payne test should not be understood as a rule governing
the overall responsibilities of the trustee under Article I, Section
27. Rather the constitutional text should serve that role. The
constitutional text, not the Payne test, was written and then
amended by the state legislature, and overwhelmingly approved by
Pennsylvania's voters.
The Payne test is narrower in scope than the public trust
clause. The public trust clause requires the governmental trustees
to conserve and maintain public resources, to make those resources
available on an equitable basis for public benefit, and to maintain
public ownership of those resources.2 °3  The Payne test, by
contrast, addresses only environmental incursions or environmental
harms.2' Thus, it is perfectly acceptable under the Payne test for
the state to restrict access to public natural resources on an
inequitable basis or to convey such resources to private persons, so
long as any environmental harm does not clearly outweigh the
benefits. The Payne test, in sum, ignores two of three types of
legal protection expressly provided by the public trust clause.
Because the common law public trust doctrines for navigable waters
and publicly dedicated land prevented the government from
allowing inequitable access or alienating public property, the Payne
test makes the constitutional public trust less protective than pre-
202. Id.
203. See PA. CONST. art I, § 27.
204. See Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
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existing law.2°5 The test thus damages the credibility and effec-
tiveness of the state's constitutional amendment process.
The Payne test is also inconsistent with the trustees' third
obligation-to "conserve and maintain" public natural resources.
In fact, the Payne test undermines the government's overall
responsibilities. It does so by substituting procedural requirements
for the substantive protection stated in the Amendment, and by
failing to connect these procedures to the Amendment's text and
purposes.
20 6
The first prong of the test requires the state to comply with all
applicable statutes and regulations relevant to its trust responsibili-
ties. Yet state government is subject to applicable laws in any
event; the Amendment does not change its responsibilities in that
regard.2° In the Payne case, in fact, application of the entire test
added nothing to the Department of Transportation's existing
responsibilities. Moreover, because statutes and regulations differ
depending on the problem being addressed, and can change over
205. In Payne, the court allowed public land to be shifted from one public use to another.
The more common Article I, Section 27 case, however, involves the private use of public
resources. By permitting the protection of public rights to be outweighed by private benefits,
the balancing test implicitly compromises public trust resources at the expense of private
wealth. The vices of balancing under the Payne test are made evident by examining what
would happen if publicly dedicated lands were subject to this test instead of the long-
established public trust rules. For example, a city is considering the sale of land dedicated
as a public park to a private sports franchise, which plans to remove the park and construct
a stadium. Under the traditional laws for public dedications, such a proposal would easily
fail because it involves the conversion of public land to private use. Under the Payne test,
however, that sale might be permitted. Because the sale is much more likely to be permissi-
ble if the project's proponents could demonstrate significant economic benefits, the test is
in some ways less about protection of the trust corpus than it is about the economic merits
of the project. It thus appears, for example, that the Payne test would allow commercial or
condominium development in state or municipal park, game, or forest lands, and perhaps
even a hazardous waste landfill or incinerator, if harm to the land were minimized, the
benefits were great enough, and there were no statutory barriers. These examples are found
in Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, in 1
PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 2-3 (Joel R. Burcat and Terry L.
Bossert eds. 1998).
The Payne test thus puts public trust resources at continuous risk of being lost to
projects that promise greater economic benefits. Because it does so, it undermines both the
language and purposes of the Amendment. See Eric Pearson & Gerald J. Hutton, Land Use
in Pennsylvania: Any Change Since the Environmental Rights Amendment?, 14 DuQ. L. REV.
165, 195 (1976).
206. See Fernandez, supra note 96, at 371 (the Payne test "eviscerated" Article I, Section
27 and "provided no new protection to the environment, a result hardly reconcilable with the
intent of the framers of Section 27").
207. See Pearson & Hutton, supra note 205, at 195.
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time, this prong of the test has no inherent substantive content.
The prong is thus deeply antagonistic to a basic purpose of Article
I, Section 27-which was to provide a separate and enduring basis
for environmental protection.
The second prong of the test, which requires the state to make
a reasonable effort to reduce environmental incursion to a
minimum,2 °8 is hardly better as a statement of overall trust
management responsibilities. The Amendment itself states that the
"Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain" the state's public
natural resources "for the benefit of all the people," including
"generations yet to come.' '2° The second prong only requires the
state to make a reasonable effort to reduce environmental incursion
to a minimum; it does not even require that environmental
incursions be minimized. Even if it did, reducing continuing
incursions on the trust corpus will not, by itself, "conserve and
maintain" the trust corpus over time. Although reducing incursions
is a necessary part of the state's responsibilities, it is not suffi-
210
cient.
The third prong authorizes the state to permit harm to the
trust corpus when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
Again, the absence of any reference to the state's explicit duty to
"conserve and maintain" resources is troubling. The trust manager
is instead authorized to allow that deterioration if the benefits are
great enough. What makes this prong especially subversive of the
Amendment is that it provides no categorical protection of the
trust; if the economic benefits of a particular project are great
enough, the state can compromise the resources, on a daily basis,
and still claim that it has carried out its responsibilities under the
trust.2 "
208. See Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
209. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
210. See also Pearson & Hutton, supra note 205, at 195-96 (somewhat similar criticisms
of second prong).
211. Despite the established administrative law principle obliging courts to defer to
administrative expertise and to remand cases where the agency has failed to address a
required matter, moreover, courts have conducted their own balancing when the Department
has failed to do so, summarily concluding that the project's benefits outweigh its costs. See
e.g., Concerned Citizens for Orderly Progress v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources,
387 A.2d 989, 994 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) ("Our own examination of the exhaustive record
reveals that the environmental impact of the sewage plant ... will be negligible, while the
social and economic benefits appear to be significant."). A court's willingness to balance in
the first instance compromises the agency's obligation altogether.
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The third prong2 12 also contradicts the principle of constitu-
tional construction requiring that the various provisions of the
constitution be interpreted as "an integrated whole., 213 Article
I, Section 27 recognizes that the state's wealth is not simply
economic or social; the "common wealth" also includes public
natural resources. Thus, any legal test to implement Article I,
Section 27 should protect and enhance social and economic
development as well as public natural resources at the same time,
Such a test would honor the obligation to interpret the various
provisions of the constitution as a whole, reading them together
instead of subordinating some to others. Rather than providing a
means of reconciling constitutionally-based goals, though, the Payne
test simply allows one set of goals to trump another. By allowing
economic and social development to outweigh protection of public
natural resources, the third prong of the Payne test violates a basic
principle of constitutional interpretation and undercuts the
Amendment's basic purpose.
The absence of any required long-term analysis of costs and
benefits is also problematic. Because the state's public natural
resources are to be held in trust for the benefit of "generations yet
to come," it is necessary to consider the costs of incursions on those
resources to future generations. Part of the Amendment's purpose,
in fact, was to prevent long-term costs to public natural resources
from their short-term exploitation for private benefit.214 The
third prong, however, contains no reference at all to the time over
which costs and benefits should be calculated.
Apart from these faults with its individual prongs, the Payne
test as a whole has two additional flaws. As a management rule,
the Payne test seems focused on case-by-case or project-by-project
decision-making. This approach is utterly inconsistent with the
widely-recognized idea that management should be guided by basic
overarching concepts.21 The obligation to conserve and maintain
public natural resources-which does not now inform use of the
test-provides such a polestar. The state cannot responsibly or
lawfully exercise its responsibilities under the Amendment without
such guidance.
212. See Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
213. See Cavanaugh v. Davis, 440 A.2d 1380, 1381 (Pa. 1982).
214. See KURY, supra note 69, at 1-3.
215. Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1340.101(a)(1) (West 1997) (stating the overall duty to
protect public natural resources under Article I, Section 27).
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Finally, the Payne test protects public natural resources against
environmental degradation less effectively than the common law
doctrines that preceded it. These doctrines require the trustee to
manage trust resources according to a discernible standard, and
make it difficult for the trustee to depart from that standard.
Because the Payne test does neither of these things, it is not even
a true public trust test. It is, rather, a "damage control" test that
allows for the continuing degradation of public natural resources.
As a result, the test provides less protection for navigable waters
and publicly dedicated lands than the common law public trust
doctrines that preceded Article I, Section 27. The test thus
compromises the integrity of the legal process that brought the
Amendment into existence.
The Payne test, but not the Payne decision, should thus be set
aside. This approach to protecting public natural resources is
consistent with the supreme court's understanding in Payne. The
supreme court was willing to tolerate the proposed changes in uses
of the public commons because the applicable transportation
statute had led to a decision that greatly reduced the project's
* 216impact. Compliance with all applicable laws, and a reasonable
effort to reduce environmental incursions-the first two prongs of
the Payne test 217 - led the court to conclude that the state had not
218violated its public trust obligation. This constitutional obliga-
tion was the central Article I, Section 27 issue litigated in the case,
not the three-prong test. Indeed, the supreme court made only a
brief reference to the test in a footnote.219
By eliminating the Payne test, courts could force parties to
think more clearly about the resources being affected. Courts
could also give themselves more discretion in fashioning an
appropriate remedy. A reviewing court's primary obligation, in
216. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976).
217. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 95 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
218. The only questionable part of the Payne decision was its allowance of 0.59 acres of
public park to be used for a public street. Because the obligation to conserve and maintain
public natural resources such as the park applies to both present and future generations, the
Payne decision could be understood to permit the nibbling away of public natural resources
in a series of such decisions over an extended period. It would have been better if the courts
had required the development of an equal-sized parcel of new park land on River Common
or a larger-sized parcel of new park land nearby. Such a decision would have permitted the
street-widening project to proceed without compromising in any way the obligation to
conserve and maintain public natural resources.
219. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 273 n.23.
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judging an allegation that the constitution has been violated, is to
decide that claim. By focusing on that claim, a court can more
clearly understand the extent, if any, to which public rights have
been or will be injured, and can force parties to do the same. The
standard for an injunction, by contrast, includes a balancing
test.2 ' Similarly, the third prong of the Payne test requires
balancing.2"' When the right and the remedy are blended, as the
Payne test suggests, it is harder to clearly understand either.
The balancing part of the Payne test also suggests an all-or-
nothing judicial decision concerning a challenged law or project
that greatly oversimplifies reality. By separating the remedy from
the violation, a court would force the parties to think more clearly
and precisely about the remedy, and thus develop more finely-
tuned solutions. Remedies to protect public resources might
include specific modifications in a project, the replacement of
affected resources, or proceeding at a different time. In such ways,
eliminating the Payne test could give courts more flexibility rather
than less.
C. Environmental Rights
1. Protected Persons. -Because the environmental rights
clause applies to "[tihe people," all Pennsylvania residents appear
to be protected.2 The environmental rights sentence in Article
I, Section 27 focuses on the specific environment where people live,
work, and play. The natural, esthetic, scenic, and historic values in
Gettysburg Tower, for example, were those of the Gettysburg
battlefield. 23
In addition, "the people" hold these rights on equal terms as
individuals. 224 This principle is considered true of all legal rights;
any individual or group that is deprived of legal rights is entitled to
judicial relief. The distribution of environmental benefits and
220. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show "first, that it is necessary
to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which would not be compensated by damages;
second, that greater injury would result by refusing than by granting it; and third, that it
properly restores the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged
unlawful conduct." Valley Forge Historical Soc'y v. Washington Memorial Chapel, 426 A.2d
1123, 1128 (Pa. 1981).
221. See Payne, 312 A.2d at 95.
222. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
223. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams County Legal
J. 75 (Pa. Com. P1. 1971).
224. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1978).
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burdens is thus squarely within the reach of the Amendment. The
values identified in the first sentence are not meaningfully or
legally protected if some people enjoy them and others do not.
Of course, it may not be enough for plaintiffs or appellants to
simply assert that they fall within the protected class. They will
also need to show that they are sufficiently affected by the action
they are challenging to meet the state's standing requirements.
22 5
2. Protected Values and Conditions. -What is protected by
the environmental rights clause? This question has not been
necessary under the three-prong Payne test; if the case involves the
environment, that is enough under Payne. Because the two parts
of the Amendment refer to different environmental features and
values, however, it is necessary under each part to identify what is
protected.
The general meaning of the people's right to "clean air, pure
water, and the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment" can be discerned from the
Amendment's text. As the clause is drafted, it gives the people the
right to two environmental conditions (clean air and pure water)
and to the preservation of four environmental values (natural,
scenic, historic, and esthetic).226
The specific content of these four values is not stated in the
Amendment, but their general meaning can be discerned from the
ordinary meaning of these words, and the way they have been
applied. Natural values are based on direct uses such as food,
clothing, drinking water, and energy.227 Natural values also
include many services that are of benefit to humans. Watersheds,
for example, can help store groundwater, limit flooding, provide
habitat, and offer recreational opportunities. Many of these
services are irreplaceable. 28 The common law already recognizes
225. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
226. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
227. See R.T. WATSON, ET AL., GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY FOR
POLICY-MAKERS 12-13 (1995).
228. See generally Robert Costanza et al, The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services
and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997) (estimating the annual economic value of global
ecological "services" at an annual average of $33 trillion, almost twice the current annual
global gross domestic product); see also Gretchen C. Daily, Valuing and Safeguarding Earth's
Life-Support Systems, in NATURE'S SERVICES 369 (Gretchen C. Daily ed. 1997) (estimating
economic value of biodiversity, natural pest enemies, forests, grasslands, and other natural
features to be "many trillions of dollars annually"). This type of analysis generally has not
yet been done for specific resources in specific places such as Pennsylvania, however. Cf
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such values to some degree by, for some example, giving property
owners a right to lateral support and a right to natural drainage
rather than flooding from new development.229 Natural values
also include the potential medicinal and economic benefits of
biodiversity as well as the psychological benefits to hunters, fishers,
hikers and others of being present in an outdoor setting.23 °
Finally, natural values of the environment necessarily include the
values of natural systems that are not affected by humans, including
ecosystem integrity and biological diversity.
Historic preservation was earlier motivated largely by the
desire to inspire a sense of patriotism or to protect the artistic merit
or architectural integrity of buildings.21 Those themes are now
integrated into a community-building rationale that emphasizes the
" 'sense of place' that older structures lend to a community, giving
individuals interest, orientation, and a sense of familiarity in their
surroundings." '232 This change in the understanding of historic
values suggests that the environmental rights clause allows some
evolution in values over time. Elasticity is particularly important
because the historic and other values identified in the first sentence
have changed over the past century, and are likely to continue to
evolve.
Scenic values include an environment that is pleasing to the
eye.233 Esthetic values in the environment are based on vision
James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 891-98 (1997).
229. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Solley, 121 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1956) (lateral support);
Westbury Realty Corp. v. Lancaster Shopping Center, Inc., 152 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1959)
(flooding); see also R. Timothy Weston, Gone With the Water-Drainage Rights and Storm
Water Management in Pennsylvania, 22 VILL. L. REv. 901, 906-37 (1977) (explaining
Pennsylvania drainage rules). The rights protected by the environmental rights clause,
however, do not depend on property ownership.
230. See 25 PA. CODE § 9.302 (West 1998) (identifying these and other values of natural
areas). The preservation of natural values can also provide people with a sense of their
connection to the natural world.
231. See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of
Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 473, 479-488 (1981). See, for example, United States
v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), which held that the federal government
had a valid public purpose when it condemned property for a national battlefield memorial
at Gettysburg. The purpose was primarily patriotic-public recognition of the effort to
preserve the union and the sacrifices made by those who fought there. See id. at 680-83.
232. See Rose, supra note 231, at 480, 488-94. Because this rationale emphasizes the
relationship between individuals and their surroundings, it is consistent with and generally
supportive of environmental protection. See id. at 483 n.48.
233. Scenic values involve "pleasing views of natural features." THE AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1613 (3rd ed. 1992).
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and other human senses-the ability to smell, hear, touch, and
taste.' In addition to the visual appeal of the environment, and
the pleasure it can bring to the senses, the concept of esthetic
values also embraces the absence of continuous loud noises,
offensive smells, and other intrusions on the senses.23 These
esthetic and scenic rights, which are less tangible than the first two,
relate more directly to the human spirit. Whether these values are
understood in psychological or religious terms, the constitution
recognizes them even if their benefits lie outside the economic
realm.
Few judicial decisions contain specific holdings on the content
of these values, although courts frequently assume that these values
are protected by the Amendment." The visibility of a proposed
private landfill to nearby residents and others implicates the scenic
and esthetic values protected by Article I, Section 27, for exam-
ple. 37 Similarly, mushroom farms and fruit orchards adjacent to
the proposed landfill have natural values that are also protected by
the Amendment. 3 The proximity of water pumping stations to
historic structures and lands implicates the historic as well as scenic
and esthetic values identified by the Amendment. 9
Litigants and judges may also find it useful to look at legisla-
tive and administrative statements of those values. These state-
ments do not have constitutional status, of course, but they provide
evidence of how those values are now understood. Thus, for
example, The Clean Streams Law states that clean water has
234. Esthetic values express beauty, and suggest greater attention to how humans
perceive that beauty. See id. at 28. The word is derived from Greek words that mean sense
perception and perceptible things. See id.
235. See Robert Broughton, Esthetics and Environmental Law: Decisions and Values, 7
LAND & WATER L. REV. 451, 463 (1972) (contrasting intrusions on "visual esthetics" by ugly
landscape features with intrusions on other esthetic values by "offensive smells and loud and
continuous noises .... ").
236. Similarly, legislation is often intended to implement Article I, Section 27, but statutes
rarely contain a more specific explication of these values.
237. See Pennsylvania Envtl. Mgt. Services, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 503 A.2d
477, 480 n.9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). Esthetic rights, however, extend only so far. See
Concerned Residents of the Yough, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 639 A.2d 1265, 1275
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) ("[N]othing in Article I, Section 27 ... explicitly provides the citizens
of Pennsylvania with a right to quiet, serene surroundings.").
238. See Pennsylvania Envtl. Mgt. Services, 503 A.2d 477.
239. See Del-AWARE, Unlimited, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 508 A.2d 348 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986).
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economic, recreational, and other benefits.2' When a litigant
asserts that such values should be protected under the environmen-
tal rights clause, the litigant is referring to values that the General
Assembly has already recognized. Other sources of recognized
values include administrative regulations2 41 and the state's envi-
ronmental master plan.242 This approach could facilitate the
identification of protected values, is more likely to ensure that the
Amendment's interpretation is consistent with currently held
values, and would make the environmental rights clause more
precise. It would not, however, prevent courts and litigants from
protecting other values when appropriate.
The rights to "clean air" and "pure water" are clearer and
seemingly more absolute than the rights to preservation of certain
environmental values. As the text is written, these rights are to be
protected for their own sake, not because they are supported by
particular values of the environment. At the same time, the
protection of these rights need not be an exercise in absolutism.
To begin with, protection of clean air and pure water likely also
preserves natural, scenic, esthetic, and perhaps even historic values
of the air and water, including ecological integrity. In addition, the
rights to "clean air" and "pure water" surely include the right to be
protected against pollutants that would kill, injure, cause disease,
or otherwise damage human health.2 43  Among other things, then,
the Amendment declares that the people have a right to a healthy
environment.2"
240. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.4(1) (West 1993) stating that "[c]lean, unpolluted
streams are absolutely essential" to "attract new manufacturing industries and to develop
Pennsylvania's full share of the tourist industry").
241. The state's municipal waste regulations, for example, require landfill operators to
prevent and control dust, odors, noise, and other esthetic problems. See 25 PA. CODE
§ 273.218 (West 1993).
242. See 25 PA. CODE § 9.1-9.317 (West 1997) (identifying many environmental values).
243. See, e.g., W. Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation of the International Community to
Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of Human Rights Norms, 3 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 112 (1990) (arguing that the right to a clean environment is funda-
mental to the right to life because "a contaminated environment will kill human life").
244. Cf. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (declaring that each "person has a right to a healthful
environment"). In fact, the terms "clean" and "pure" suggest that this right is not to be
understood as requiring scientific certainty about what is healthy or unhealthy; fewer
contaminants are better than more. These terms partially support the propriety of a recently
enunciated state goal of zero releases of pollutants that are known to have adverse health
effects. See REPORT OF 21sT CENTURY COMMISSION, supra note 72, at 46 (restating
previously enunciated goal). The part of the policy requiring scientific certainty about health
effects, however, is inconsistent with the "clean" and "pure" language; pollutants are
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Finally, whatever else "pure" and "clean" may mean, the terms
almost certainly create a presumption against the state allowing the
air to become less clean and the water less pure than they are at
present. In these cases, the issue is not about abstract standards of
cleanliness or purity; it is about actions that make existing air or
water quality worse. The rights to clean air and pure water, in
sum, generally should prevent actions that would degrade air or
water.2 45  Such judicial actions are also consistent with a basic
purpose of the Amendment -prevention of environmental
backsliding.
3. Responsible Parties.-Under the environmental rights
clause, a governmental entity is the most likely defendant or
appellee. As already explained, the entity's asserted lack of
statutory authority to protect environmental rights does not provide
an exception to this rule. The environmental rights clause fills
precisely such gaps in the government's statutory authority to
protect environmental rights.
Of course, a private party could also be the defendant in a
governmental action to prevent or control injury to the public's
environmental rights. Such a suit would be like that filed in
Gettysburg Tower.2'
pollutants.
245. Cf Montana Envtl. Information Center v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, No 97-455, 1999
Mont. LEXIS 266 (Mont. Oct. 20, 1999) (holding that state constitutional right to a clean and
healthy environment is implicated by addition of arsenic to surface waters from ground water
pumping tests when the Department has concluded addition of arsenic will have a significant
water quality impact). The legislature had specifically exempted discharges from such tests
from review under the state's water quality nondegradation rules. See id. at *26-27. The
court decided that this legislative exemption should be subject to strict scrutiny under certain
provisions of the Montana Constitution, see MONT. CONST. art II, § 3 (stating that all persons
have "the right to a clean and healthful environment"); MONT. CONST. art IX, § 1 (requiring
the "State and each person [to] maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in
Montana for present and future generations"). See Montana Envtl. Information Center, 1999
Mont. LEXIS 266, at *24 & *45. It remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of whether there is a compelling state interest for enactment of the exemption,
whether the exemption "is closely tailored to effectuate that interest," and whether the
exemption represents "the least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state's
objective." Id. at *32-34 & *47 (citing Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont.
1996)).
246. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams County Legal
J. 45; Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams County Legal J. 75
(Pa. Com. P1. 1971).
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4. Violation of Rights.-A litigant needs to demonstrate that
these rights have been, or are about to be, violated. This demon-
stration would ordinarily involve presentation of evidence showing
1) actual or likely injury or damage to specific environmental
features, and 2) corresponding injury to values or conditions
protected by the Amendment. Without some actual or threatened
environmental degradation, it is not possible to claim corresponding
injury to the scenic, historic, esthetic, or natural values in the
environment, or to clean air or pure water. As Gettysburg Tower
suggests, the standard is difficult to meet.247 When the govern-
ment has protected these values or conditions, it would be
impossible to meet.
Because the environmental rights clause does not require the
preservation of specific features, however, a defendant should be
able to present evidence that the challenged action includes
compensating, mitigating, or offsetting aspects that will restore or
enhance the values that are damaged. These compensating or
offsetting features should, under the terms of that sentence, involve
preservation and even enhancement of air quality, water quality, or
the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment.
The inherently local aspect of quality of life suggests that these
aspects of the proposal must also occur in the same place as the
proposal in question.
When a violation of the right to clean air or pure water is
alleged, it should not ordinarily be sufficient to show that the
proposed action would add some amount of contamination to the
air or water. The Air Pollution Control Act and The Clean
Streams Law,24 as well as the regulations adopted under those
statutes, already limit the amount of permissible air and water
contamination or pollution. Under these laws, the Department of
Environmental Protection makes decisions about the permissible
concentration of particular pollutants in parts per million or
milligrams per liter. The courts should ensure that particular values
of clean air and pure water, such as human health, ecological
247. See id. The court in Gettysburg Tower required the government to prove its case
by clear and convincing evidence, but only because the state was seeking an injunction. See
Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams County Legal J. 134, 136-37
(Pa. Com. Pl. 1971).
248. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (West 1993) (The Clean Streams Law); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35 §§ 4001-4106 (1993 & West Supp. 1999-2000) (Air Pollution Control Act).
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integrity, and nondegradation are being protected by such deci-
sions."
Thus, litigants would need to show that a particular concentra-
tion or discharge of pollutant injures both the environment and the
particular values or qualities protected by the Amendment. When
the Department has considered the same values or qualities as
those considered in a challenge to the Department's action, it
would be appropriate for a court to defer to the Department's
expertise on questions of fact (but not on questions of constitu-
tional law). When the Department has not considered those values
or qualities, or when the Department has not considered them
thoroughly or carefully, deference on questions of fact is not
appropriate.
5. Relationship to Public Trust.-The environmental rights
and public trust clauses both apply when they overlap. The
environmental rights clause applies to most, if not all, public
natural resources covered by the constitutional public trust. Thus,
virtually every constitutional public trust case will also be an
environmental rights case.25
This overlap has important consequences for public natural
resources, because the environmental rights clause strengthens and
clarifies the state's responsibilities for all public natural resources.
Thus, under the public trust clause, the state must conserve and
maintain public natural resources, make them available on an
equitable basis to the public, and keep them in public ownership.
Because public natural resources include surface and groundwater
as well as the air, the environmental rights clause also applies to
such resources. This clause, moreover, requires the state to protect
the public's right to "clean air" and "pure water. '' "l In so doing,




Public natural resources also have natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic values that are protected under the environmental rights
249. This reading of the Amendment also precludes the opening of judicial floodgates
based on a reading of clean air and pure water as requiring laboratory cleanliness or purity.
250. Environmental rights cases, by contrast, are not necessarily public trust cases. In
Gettysburg Tower, for example, the issue was the potential effect on environmental rights of
an observation tower built on private land. The tower had no direct or indirect impacts on
public trust resources.
251. See PA. CoNsT. art I, § 27.
252. See id.
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clause. The trust obligation to conserve and maintain public
natural resources is somewhat different from the trust obligation to
preserve certain values in those public resources. One concerns
resources, and the other concerns values in those resources; the first
requires conservation, and the second requires preservation.
Conservation of renewable resources such as forests, for example,
ordinarily requires that the amount of harvesting not exceed the
rate of replenishment. In that way, the materials provided are
continually available. But conservation by itself might conceivably
be inconsistent with preservation of natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic values, or with clean air and pure water. The state could
lease public forest lands for clearcutting in a manner that allows
regrowth of the trees, but which greatly interferes with the integrity
of unique ecosystems. Such a decision would likely violate the
Amendment.
III. Principle-Reinforcing Rules
The public trust and environmental rights clauses of Article I,
Section 27 can also be used to support government actions taken
under other laws on behalf of the values or principles that it states,
and can even be used to challenge governmental actions that
undermine those values or principles. Indeed, Pennsylvania courts
have already recognized three principle-reinforcing applications of
the Amendment. Article I, Section 27 has confirmed and even
extended the application of the police power, has been used to
interpret or support the interpretation of statutes, and has provided
constitutional authority for laws whose constitutionality was being
challenged. 3  Nor do these uses constitute all of the Amend-
ment's possible principle-reinforcing rules. For example, the public
trust clause should be used to require the state to conduct a
periodic accounting on the status of public natural resources.
1. Confirmation and Extension of Police Power. -The
Amendment's first sentence confirms and extends the police power
of the state as well as local governments to protect the values and
conditions that it identifies. By stating that the public has a right
to clean air, pure water, and the preservation of the natural, scenic,
253. In most of these cases, the Amendment has been invoked as an undivided whole.
It is likely that the separate use of the environmental rights or public trust clauses would
provide more specific and useful principle-reinforcing applications of Article I, Section 27.
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historic, and esthetic values of the environment, Article I, Section
27 confirms and even extends previous cases holding these values
to be squarely within the scope of public health, safety, welfare, or
morals. Similarly, the public trust clause confirms and extends
earlier cases holding that the state had the power to protect public
natural resources. State or local laws intended to protect those val-
ues and resources may perhaps be successfully challenged on other
grounds, 254 but they cannot be challenged as outside the scope of
the government's police power.255
Because the police power provides state and local governments
with authority to protect the community, it is one of their "most
essential powers."256 Thus, the first question raised in challenges
to governmental regulation is whether the action is within the scope
of the government's police power. The statute, ordinance, or other
governmental action must promote public health, safety, morals,
and welfare; otherwise, it is invalid.257 The test is framed some-
what differently for state actions than for municipal zoning
ordinances. State actions are legally justified if "the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference," if "the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishing of the purpose," and if the means are "not
unduly oppressive upon individuals." 8  A zoning ordinance is a
valid exercise of the police power if it promotes public health,
safety, or welfare, and if its provisions are substantially related to
its purported purpose.29 Pennsylvania courts apply that test by
balancing the public interest furthered by the ordinance against its
confiscatory or exclusionary impact on individual rights.26  The
first question in both situations, however, is whether the challenged
government action is within the scope of the police power.
254. See e.g., infra note 258 and accompanying text.
255. See Lazarus, supra note 115, at 655-56 (discussing cases from other states in which
public trust doctrine has been used to support exercise of governmental authority). This
affirmation and extension of the police power also suggests that local governments have
standing to challenge state decisions that substantially affect the rights identified in the first
sentence. See Franklin Township v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 452 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1982)
(plurality opinion).
256. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
257. See infra text accompanying notes 258-60.
258. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461, 465 (Pa. 1977) (quoting
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
259. See Boundary Drive Assoc. v. Shrewsbury Township Board of Supervisors, 491 A.2d
86, 90 (Pa. 1985).
260. See id.
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The state as well as municipalities thus have the police power
authority to adopt legislation to protect the environmental rights
stated in the first sentence, and to implement the public trust
clause.26' Even the supreme court plurality in Gettysburg Tower,
which concluded that Amendment is not self-executing, stated that
the Amendment both affirms and adds to the legislature's power to
further define the values protected in Article I, Section 27.262
The court found that the state previously had the power to
establish standards for clean air and water to protect human
health.263  But the Amendment also authorizes the state to
exercise its police power solely for esthetic or historical consider-
ations.2' According to the plurality, the Commonwealth previ-
ously lacked that authority.265 In stating that legislation is re-
quired to define and protect the values identified in the Amend-
ment,' 6 the plurality indicated that the legislature unquestionably
has the authority to enact such laws.
On the police power issue, the plurality is generally cor-
rect.267 Prior to adoption of the Amendment, municipalities and
the state unquestionably possessed authority to adopt legislation
concerning air and water quality.2' In subsequent cases, courts
have identified Article I, Section 27 as an additional basis for the
261. The self-executing status of Article I, Section 27 is irrelevant to this question. If a
constitutional provision is not self-executing, it can only be given effect through legislation.
Such a provision must thus necessarily provide the authority for implementing legislation.
Even if a provision is self-executing, its self-executing status does not preclude the adoption
of implementing legislation.
262. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 592 (Pa.
1973).
263. See id. at 592.
264. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
265. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 592. The opinion did not discuss police
power authority to protect natural or scenic values.
266. See id. at 595.
267. The principle exception to the plurality's conclusion involves esthetic values, where
the state's police power was fairly well recognized even before the Amendment was adopted.
See infra note 314 and accompanying text. 1
268. See, e.g., Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (water); Common-
wealth v. Emmers, 70 A. 762 (Pa. 1908) (water).
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exercise of that authority,269 and have even used the Amendment
to slightly extend the state's authority to protect water quality.
In Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Coal Co.,270 the state
sought an injunction requiring a coal mining company to treat large
volumes of acid mine drainage that were flowing into streams from
an underground mine the company had recently closed.27' The
269. In 1980, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of Section 316 of The Clean
Streams Law, which authorizes the Department to order a landowner or occupier to correct
pollution or danger of pollution on the property. See National Wood Preservers, Inc. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 414 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980). In that case, a couple leased land to a
wood preservative business, which then discharged waste liquids containing toxic substances
into a well on the property. See id. When those substances were found in a nearby stream,
the Department issued orders to the landowners and the business to abate this condition,
using Section 316 as its sole authority. See id. at 39. The agency did not assert a violation
of the environmental rights clause even though the discharge interfered with the public's
constitutional right to "pure water," nor did the agency assert a violation of the public's right
to the conservation of public natural resources, even though the discharge degraded
groundwater and a stream. See id. In challenging the statute, the landowners and the
business did not question the department's claim that Section 316 is in the public interest.
See id. at 43-44. Rather, they claimed that section 316 is an improper exercise of the police
power. See National Wood Preservers, 414 A.2d at 42. The court rejected that claim. See
id. at 44. Article I, Section 27 "imposes a duty upon the Commonwealth to protect our
environment," the court reasoned. See id. at 44. "Indeed, maintenance of the environment
is a fundamental objective of state power." Id. The court added that the state has long had
an inherent interest in protecting the environment, and has furthered that interest with water
quality legislation. See id.
The court also rejected arguments that the means the Department chose were not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of its purposes, and that the means were unduly
oppressive to individuals, although it did not use Article I, Section 27 in disposing of these
claims. The landowners and the wood preservative business focused their constitutional
argument on the claim that the means chosen by the Department were unduly oppressive
to individuals. See National Wood Preservers, 414 A.2d at 45-47. The gist of their argument
was that Section 316 imposes liability solely on the basis of land ownership or occupancy.
See id. The court rejected that argument because the orders were also based on legislation
designed to eliminate water pollution as well as findings that polluting substances exist on
the land and can feasibly be removed. See id. In addition, the court reasoned that the
exercise of police power depends on the public's interest in having the condition abated, not
on the responsibility of the landowner or occupier for creating the condition. See id.
In a recent decision, the supreme court extended its prior holding to lessees who are
neither responsible for groundwater contamination nor even aware of it, as long as pollution
exists under the land and abatement is feasible. See Adams Sanitation Co. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Resources, 715 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1998). In so doing, it repeated its prior conclusion that Section
316 satisfied the public interest and "reasonably necessary" means tests "in light of Article
I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the stated purpose of the Clean Streams
Law." Id. at 395; see also Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Locust Point Quarries, Inc., 396 A.2d
1205, 1209 (Pa. 1979) (air quality); Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 367
A.2d 222, 226 n.10 (Pa. 1976) (air quality); Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d
308, 317 (Pa. 1973) (water quality).
270. 303 A.2d 544 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), rev'd, 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974).
271. See id. at 545.
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discharge interfered with the public's right to "pure water" and to
the conservation of public natural resources, although the state
does not appear to have made a claim based solely on the Amend-
ment."2 Rather, the state's complaint was based in part on public
nuisance. As the supreme court recognized, the Amendment
makes a public nuisance claim easier to prove.273 Under prior
public nuisance law, the pollution of a stream created an enjoinable
nuisance "if the public uses the water. 27 4 The streams in Barnes
& Tucker, however, were already polluted from sewage as well as
acid mine drainage from other mines, and there was almost no
evidence that the public used them.275 The supreme court held
that pollution of a stream automatically caused a public nuisance,
even if the stream was not previously being used.276 Quoting
Article I, Section 27, the court said that "the public has a sufficient
interest in clean streams alone regardless of any specific use
thereof.''27   The constitutional declarations that the public has a
right to pure water and the conservation of public natural resourc-
es, in short, make the violation of these rights actionable as a
public nuisance.
The Amendment also appears to have resolved doubts about
police power authority to protect historic values. Before the
Amendment, the commonwealth court assumed but did not decide
that municipalities had the authority to protect historic values.
27 8
Afterwards, the supreme court confirmed the exercise of that
authority.279 In fact, Philadelphia amended and strengthened its
historic preservation ordinance subsequent to the adoption of, and
in apparent reliance on, Article I, Section 27.8°
272. See id. at 559
273. See Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Coal Co. 319 A.2d 871, 880 (Pa. 1974).
274. See id. at 882 (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 126 A.2d 386, 387
(Pa. 1924) (stream was considered pure, and was used as a supply of water for domestic
consumption by a large number of people)).
275. See Barnes & Tucker Coal Co., 303 A.2d at 571.
276. See Barnes & Tucker Coal Co., 319 A.2d at 882.
277. Id.
278. See First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of the City of York, 360 A.2d
257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (upholding the denial of demolition permit for historic building
and assuming, because the church did not argue otherwise, that the statute and local ordi-
nance on which the denial was based were within the government's police power).
279. See United Artists' Theater Circuit v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
280. See United Artists Theater Circuit v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6,8-9 (Pa. 1991);
see also Unionville-Chadds Ford School District v. Chester County Board of Assessment
Appeals, 692 A.2d 1136 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997). The court upheld a real estate tax
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The Amendment's effect on the exercise of the police power,
however, is a double-edged sword. Just as it provides the state
with the authority to act to protect the values and resources it
identifies, Article I, Section 27 also deprives the state, under some
circumstances, of authority to degrade or diminish those values.
For example, many municipal ordinances prohibit landowners from
growing "excessive vegetation," which might be defined as
vegetation exceeding six to twelve inches in height except for
"useful or ornamental purposes."281  Such weed ordinances have
traditionally been justified as valid exercises of police power
because of their association with junky lots and their potential to
adversely affect public health by producing allergenic pollen and
odors. 28 2 But such ordinances also target landowners who create
"natural gardens" they believe to be "environmentally superior to
typical manicured lawns."" Indeed, a growing body of literature
suggests both the utility and attractiveness of landscaping with
native vegetation and reducing the amount of one's property that
is covered with grass.
2 4
Property owners who use their property in this manner surely
are contributing to the preservation and restoration of the natural,
scenic, esthetic, and perhaps even historic values of the environ-
ment. These property owners should thus be able to successfully
assert under the first sentence of Article I, Section 27 that
municipalities lack the police power authority to interfere with the
preservation of these values on their land. This approach would
not protect property owners from enforcement of weed ordinances
where their property contains junk, harbors rodents or dangerous
insects, or produces allergens or noxious odors. 5  Article I,
exemption for Longwood Gardens, a 1,050 acre public garden, in part because its owner
"bears a substantial burden that would otherwise fall to the government in the areas of
historic preservation, conservation of wild resources, and provision of open space for public
recreation." Id. at 1141. Citing Article I, Section 27 and several statutes, the court reasoned
that the state had an obligation to provide for such public areas. See id. If the land had
been donated to the local government "instead of placing it in trust and providing an
endowment, the government would arguably bear the considerable burden of the facility's
management and maintenance." Id. at 1142.
281. See Commonwealth v. Siemel, 686 A.2d 899, 900 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (quoting
the Borough of Lansdale's weed and grass ordinance, Ordinance 876 § 1(D)).
282. See Sobocinski v. City of Williamsport, 319 A.2d 697, 700 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
283. Seimel, 686 A.2d at 902 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
284. See, e.g., KEN DRUSE, THE NATURAL HABITAT GARDEN (1994); WILLIAM H.W.
WILSON, LANDSCAPING WITH WILDFLOWERS AND NATIVE PLANTS (1984).
285. See Siemel, 686 A.2d at 902 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
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Section 27 would, however, require a fact-finder to weigh the
competing claims of the landowner and municipality rather than
simply assuming that enforcement of the weed ordinance is a valid
exercise of the police power.
2. Guidance in Statutory Interpretation. -Article I, Section 27
imposes responsibilities or obligations on the legislature. Because
Article I, Section 27 gives certain rights to the "people," it follows
that each branch of government has a responsibility to ensure that
those rights are protected. When the legislature acts in ways that
result in greater protection of those rights, therefore, it is reason-
able to conclude that it is fulfilling its constitutional responsibility,
whether or not the legislation identifies implementation of Article
I, Section 27 as one of its purposes. 28 Thus, when there is any
doubt about the meaning of a legislative provision, the doubt
should be resolved on behalf of the interpretation that protects the
environmental rights or public natural resources identified in
Article I, Section 27.'
A 1998 supreme court decision involving Section 316 of The
Clean Streams Law is illustrative of this use of the Amend-
ment. 8 Section 316 authorizes the Department of Environmen-
tal Protection to order a land owner or occupier to correct
pollution on the property.2 9 The department issued a groundwa-
286. See Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1370-71 (Pa. 1986)
(describing legislative responsibility for implementation of Article I, Section 27); Part I, supra
note 1, at 729-31.
287. Statutes are often interpreted to conform to state constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984). In
the Hartford Accident case, the supreme court decided that gender-based auto insurance
rates were "unfairly discriminatory" under a state insurance statute. See id. The decision
was based in large part on the Equal Rights Amendment to the state constitution, see id. at
547, which provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 28. Because of this amendment, the court held, "the statute must be interpreted to include
sex discrimination as one type of unfair discrimination." Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
542 A.2d at 549. The constitution did not simply allow the Insurance Commissioner to
interpret the statute in that manner, the court reasoned, rather the constitution required that
interpretation. See id.
288. See Adams Sanitation Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 715 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1998).
289. Section 316 of The Clean Streams Law provides in part:
Whenever the department finds that pollution or a danger of pollution is resulting
from a condition which exists on land in the Commonwealth the department may
order the landowner or occupier to correct the condition in a manner satisfactory
to the department or it may order such owner or occupier to allow a mine
operator or other person or agency of the Commonwealth access to the land to
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ter pollution abatement order to a company that had leased land
for use as a municipal waste landfill even though the lessee did not
cause or even know about the groundwater pollution.29° Because
Section 316 is so potentially harsh, allowing the state to "compel
the expenditure of financial sums by an owner or occupant of land
based on no other factor but the ownership or occupancy of the
land,'29 t such cases encourage interpretations of Section 316 that
would narrow its scope. Indeed, in an earlier case, the common-
wealth court had specifically held that Section 316 was generally
inapplicable to landowners and lessees who did not discharge
industrial waste into the groundwater.2 2
In challenging the order, the lessee argued that Section 316
should be interpreted so that a party is liable only for water
pollution it caused or knew about before leasing or operating on
the property.293  Relying in part on Article I, Section 27, the
supreme court rejected this argument and implicitly overruled the
earlier commonwealth court decision.294 The supreme court first
noted that the plain language of Section 316 contains no limitation
based on fault or knowledge.295 The court then stated that such
take such action. For the purpose of this section, "landowner" includes any
person holding title to or having a proprietary interest in either surface or
subsurface rights.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.316 (West 1993).
290. Because groundwater is a public natural resource, its protection implicates the public
trust part of the Amendment. Since its degradation is inconsistent with the conservation and
maintenance of public natural resources, as well as the public's right to "pure water" and to
protection of the natural and esthetic values of the environment, this case involves both parts
of Article I, Section 27.
291. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 414 A.2d 37, 47 (Pa.
1980) (Flaherty, J., concurring).
292. See Philadelphia Chewing Gum Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 387 A.2d 142 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1978), affd in part sub nom., 414 A.2d 37, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 803
(1980). The commonwealth court made an exception for landowners and lessees who took
action indicating adoption of the contamination after gaining knowledge of it. See id. at 150.
The state had issued orders to several landowners in this case-the owner of land on
which the groundwater discharges had occurred, the company that leased the land and
discharged pollution, and two others (another lessee and an adjoining landowner) who had
not caused groundwater pollution. Because the two others had not caused groundwater
pollution, the commonwealth court held that they were not liable under Section 316. The
state did not file a timely appeal of that part of commonwealth court's decision. See National
Wood Preservers, Inc., 414 A.2d at 40 n.8.
293. See Adams Sanitation Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 715 A.2d 390 (Pa.
1998).
294. See id.
295. See id. at 393-94.
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limitations would be inconsistent with the purposes of The Clean
Streams Law, which include the elimination of all water pollu-
tion."' The lessee's interpretation, the court reasoned, would
delay clean-ups and often permit the condition of sites to worsen
because the Department of Environmental Protection would have
to conduct an extensive investigation into the cause of pollution
before issuing an order.297 The court also said that the lessee's
interpretation is inconsistent with the "legislative mandate con-
tained in Article I, Section 27.
' 298
This and other cases involving Section 316 of The Clean
Streams Law use the Amendment as support for arguments based
on the statutory text and purposes. 299 The "legislative mandate"
to implement Article I, Section 27 appears to play a significant and
perhaps decisive role in supporting the stated meaning of Section
316. Because the legislature has an obligation to implement the
Amendment, Article I, Section 27 could also be used to decide
cases based on vaguer statutory language. Therefore, statutes that
affect the values and resources identified in the Amendment should
be interpreted in ways that foster its implementation. Statutes that
affect public natural resources should be interpreted to require the
conservation and maintenance of those resources for present and
future generations. Similarly, statutes that affect environmental
rights should be interpreted to protect the public's right to clean
air, pure water, and the preservation of natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic values of the environment.
3. Constitutional Authority for Laws Whose Constitutionality
is Challenged on Other Grounds.-Pennsylvania courts have
decided constitutional challenges to government regulation by
relying in part on the Amendment as authority for state or local
action. One line of cases involves protection of privately-owned
historic properties. Here, Article I, Section 27 has provided a
296. See id. at 394 (citing PA. STAT., tit. 35, §§ 691.4 (West 1993)).
297. See id. at 394.
298. Adams Sanitation Co., Inc., 715 A.2d at 394.
299. See National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 414 A.2d 37, 41
(Pa. 1980) (claim that Section 316 applies only to pollution caused by mining is inconsistent
with statutory language and would "frustrate the Legislature's fulfillment of its obligation"
under Article I, Section 27); Dresser Indus. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 604 A.2d 1177,
1180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (claim that Section 316 does not apply to the Commonwealth
as landowner because it would "frustrate the Legislature's fulfillment of its obligation under
Article I, section 27").
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buffer against the expansion of private property rights in ways that
would interfere with protection of the values contained in the first
part of the Amendment. In United Artists' Theater Circuit v. City
of Philadelphia,00 the city of Philadelphia designated a motion
picture theater as historic, which subjected it to certain restrictions.
The theater's owner then challenged that action.3 1 There is no
doubt that historic preservation ordinances are generally valid
under the U.S. Constitution.3 2 The theater's owner therefore
argued that the ordinance violated the Pennsylvania constitution
because it effectuated a taking of private property without
compensation.3 3 The essential claim was that the Pennsylvania
constitution provided more protection for private property owners
than the U.S. Constitution. When it initially decided the case, in
fact, the state supreme court agreed with that claim, holding the
ordinance to effect an unconstitutional taking.3" After reargu-
ment, however, the court reversed itself and held that the ordi-
nance did not effect a taking.3"5
In reversing itself, the court relied partly on Article I, Section
27, whose first sentence explicitly provides a public right to
preservation of the historic and esthetic values of the environment.
The Amendment protected the ordinance against the theater
owner's takings claim. The takings provision of the Pennsylvania
constitution is virtually identical to that in the federal constitu-
tion.30 6 When the state and federal constitutions contain the
same rights, the Pennsylvania constitution sometimes provides more
300. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
301. See id.
302. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
303. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, 635 A.2d 612; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
304. See United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia 595 A.2d 6 (Pa.
1991).
305. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc., 635 A.2d 612 (but holding that the city had
acted outside the scope of its own ordinance by designating the theater as historic). The city
designated both the exterior and interior of the building as historic. The ordinance did not
provide the city with explicit authority to designate building interiors, however. The
commonwealth court had held that the ordinance was intended to include both, regardless
of the ordinance's language, and that the city's action was within the scope of the ordinance.
See Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 558 A.2d 155, 157 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
Because the ordinance did not provide "clear and unmistakable" authority to designate a
building's interior, the supreme court vacated the city's designation. See United Artists'
Theater Circuit, Inc., 635 A.2d at 622.
306. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V with PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1
protection of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution.3" To
make a claim that the Pennsylvania constitution provides greater
rights, litigants are required to address several factors, one of which
is "unique issues of state and local concern."3" With respect to
that factor, the court held that Article I, Section 27 weighed against
a decision that the ordinance effected a taking.3" The Amend-
ment, the court held, "reflects a state policy encouraging the
preservation of historic and esthetic resources. ,311 The court
added that Article I, Section 27 reflects "a general public interest
in preserving historic landmarks," that no other practical means
exists for preserving such landmarks, and that the ordinance neither
deprives the owner of a profitable use nor constitutes a physical
intrusion on the property.311  Thus, Article I, Section 27 both
supported the extension of the police power to historic preserva-
tion, and helped defend this extension against a property-based
constitutional challenge.312
The same reasoning that protected the historic preservation
ordinance under the environmental rights clause could also support
decisions protecting public natural resources under the public trust
part. Because the state owns public trust resources, it should be
virtually impossible for landowners to claim property rights to their
use, degradation, or alienation.313
307. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (Pennsylvania
constitution does not incorporate good faith exception to exclusionary rule for violation of
constitutional requirement that search warrants be obtained prior to any search or seizure).
308. Id. at 895. The other factors are the text of the state constitutional provision, its
history, and related case law in other states. See id.
309. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc., 635 A.2d at 620.
310. Id. On the other three factors, the court noted that the text of the state and federal
provisions is similar, that the state generally follows federal case law on the takings, and that
no state had held a historic designation to be a taking. See id.
311. See id. at 618-19.
312. The Amendment has also been used to support the constitutionality of governmental
prosecutions of environmental crimes. See Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Blozenski Disposal
Service, 566 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1989) (challenge to constitutionality of a warrantless administra-
tive search); Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986) (claim that
two different penalties for the same offense violated the state and federal constitutions).
313. See Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of
Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands
and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that the public
trust doctrine prevents private property owners from claiming reasonable expectations in the
use, acquisition, and transfer of lands subject to the public trust). It is still possible to make
a successful claim for a compensable taking under the Pennsylvania or U.S. Constitutions,
but not on that basis.
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As the supreme court's analysis in United Artists' Theater
Circuit indicates, the Amendment's protection against constitutional
challenges is not absolute. Esthetic values provide another
example, even though they also are obviously protected by Article
I, Section 27. Courts have generally, but not universally, recog-
nized the validity of esthetic considerations as a basis for exercise
of the police power.314 The use of esthetic values to justify
government decisions raises judicial suspicion, however, especially
when these values are unsupported by health, safety, environmental
protection, or other justifications. Thus, licensing requirements
based only on esthetic considerations are invalid because they are
vague and standardless.3" Similarly, zoning ordinances that
establish multiple-acre minimum lot sizes to protect the "character
of the area" or its appearance, but which also have an exclusionary
purpose or effect, are also invalid.316 Although the Amendment
was not invoked in these cases, there is no reason to believe it
should have changed their outcomes. The constitutionally-based
countervailing interests in these cases are simply greater than that
expressed in Article I, Section 27.
4. Accounting for Status of Public Natural Resources.-The
public trust clause also suggests some principle-reinforcing rules
that are unique to trust law, and that have not previously been
recognized under Article I, Section 27. Such rules would enhance
the likelihood that the public's common property will be protected
in accordance with the constitution.
314. See, e.g., Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (Pa. 1958)
("preservation of the attractive characteristics of a community [is] a proper element of the
general welfare"); Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 141
A.2d 851, 857 (Pa. 1957) ("esthetic considerations have progressively become more and more
persuasive as sustaining reasons for the exercise of the police power"). But see Redevel-
opment Authority of Oil City v. Woodring, 445 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1982) (municipal authority's
decision to require all electrical lines to be relocated underground solely for esthetic reasons
held to be exercise of eminent domain power, not police power).
315. See Orwell Township Supervisors v. Jewett, 571 A.2d 1100 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)
(invalidating ordinance that authorized denial of a junkyard license for esthetic reasons or
because of the operation's effect on other properties). But see Cox v. New Sewickley
Township, 284 A.2d 829 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971) (upholding junkyard ordinance that was
based on protection of public health, safety, and the environment as well as esthetic consider-
ations).
316. See e.g., Concord Township Appeal, 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970); Girsh Appeal, 263
A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970); National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965); Berman v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 608 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1992).
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As many states have recognized, private trust law provides
choices in the application of public trust law that may not otherwise
be apparent. Thus, when specific private trust law principles are
consistent with the language and purposes of public trust laws,
these principles have been imported into public trust law.317
While other private trust principles may assist in the implementa-
tion of the public trust clause, three seem particularly relevant.
The first is the trustee's basic obligation to keep detailed and
accurate accounts on the type and amount of trust property, and on
the trustee's administration of that property.318 The obligation to
inventory the trust corpus is basic to trust law, and includes a
continuing obligation to record changes in the property.319 Thus,
even though not expressly required by its text, the public trust
clause necessarily requires the state to conduct a periodic and
continuing inventory of the public natural resources that the state
owns. Otherwise, there is no practical way of knowing whether the
state is complying with its constitutional obligations for public trust
resources. By conducting such an inventory and accounting, the
state would identify the resources it believes are protected by the
constitution. The state would also have to describe the condition
of these resources, as well as existing threats to them. Otherwise,
it could not be said that the state had an accurate understanding of
the status of public trust resources.
No such inventory and accounting has yet been done. It might
be possible to cobble together some kind of inventory of public
natural resources from various state agencies. Among state
agencies, however, there are likely to be information gaps concern-
ing natural resources as well as differences between published and
current information.32 ° It is difficult, moreover, to understand the
big picture until that picture is assembled.
A second obligation of trustees under private and charitable
trust law is to report to the beneficiaries at their request complete
317. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
318. See BOGERT, supra note 108, § 140; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 172 & cmt. a (1959). See, e.g., In re Estate of Nesbitt, 533 A.2d 1015, 1021 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987).
319. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 318, § 172 cmt. c.
320. As of April 1, 1998, for example, the stated had assessed water quality and aquatic
life in only 12,831 of the state's 83,261 miles of streams. See REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY
COMMISSION, supra note 72, at 43. About one third of these waters, 4,314 miles, are
impaired. See id.
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and accurate information concerning trust property.3 1 Essential-
ly, this obligation ensures that the basic information developed
about the status of the trust corpus is available to beneficiaries on
a regular basis. Again, this obligation is an outgrowth of the
trustee's primary duties, and provides an incentive for the trustee
to comply with these duties. The obligation to report to beneficia-
ries is considered so central to the trustee's basic obligations under
the trust that Pennsylvania courts have implied this duty even when
not expressly required by the trust instrument.322 Moreover, a
public accounting would provide an overall understanding of the
status of public natural resources that is unavailable from an
analysis of specific problems or cases. The state should thus
periodically publish a report identifying public trust resources, their
condition, and current and foreseeable threats. Such reporting
would also provide information to the public concerning problems
and threats that could stimulate and encourage debate about
legislative or executive efforts to address them. While there is now
some public reporting on progress in cleaning air or water, and on
related issues, there is no comprehensive public report on public
natural resources.
323
The final obligation of trustees under private trust law is to
permit third parties to examine the accounts and all relevant
documents to ensure the accuracy and completeness of these
accounts. 324  This auditing mechanism helps prevent and correct
321. See BOGERT, supra note 108, § 141; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 318, § 173.
Pennsylvania law recognized this responsibility even before adoption of the first restatement.
See In re Estate of Rosenblum, 328 A.2d 158, 165 n.6 (Pa. 1974); see also Bixler v. Central
Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("This
duty to inform is a constant thread in the relationship between beneficiary and trustee; it
entails not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform
when the trustee knows that silence might be harmful.").
322. See, e.g., Fidelity Bank v. Commonwealth Marine and General Assurance Co., 592
F. Supp. 513, 528-29 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (exculpatory paragraph in trust agreement does not
abrogate responsibility to report to beneficiaries under Section 173 of Restatement).
323. Proposals to use numerical indicators to measure environmental conditions are
similar to what is being argued here. See REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION, supra
note 72, at 71-74. If environmental indicators covered all public natural resources in the
manner described in this Article, in fact, they would accomplish the same result. Such
indicators are not simply good policy, however; they are required by Article I, Section 27.
324. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 318, § 173 cmt. a (private trustee obliged to permit
accountant to examine relevant documents); see also BOGERT, supra note 108, § 142 (trustee
under duty to render formal accounting in court of equity when required by court or
required by statute).
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both errors and fraud, and thus enhances the likelihood of
adherence to the trustee's basic duties.
This obligation should also be imported into public trust law
under Article I, Section 27. The temptation by governors and
department heads to use environmental information for political
purposes, to change the information being reported from adminis-
tration to administration, to omit or understate problems, and to
overstate progress is simply too great-under any administra-
tion-to permit any other conclusion. In fact, the state might best
carry out its responsibilities under the Amendment by delegating
the entire task of accounting and public reporting to some kind of
independent or quasi-independent entity, perhaps a university or
consortium of universities. The long-term integrity of the state's
commitment to public natural resources requires some kind of
independent assessment or auditing.
These obligations are obviously judicially enforceable by
beneficiaries in private trust law. 325 They should also be judicially
enforceable by beneficiaries under the public trust clause.
IV. Conclusion
My purpose is to begin again a serious discussion about what
Article I, Section 27 means and should be recognized to mean. It
deserves this discussion not only because it protects the environ-
ment, not only because most of that discussion was abruptly cut off
by creation of the Payne test, but also-and most fundamental-
ly-because it is constitutional law. Article I, Section 27 is richer
in meaning and ultimately more necessary than we may have
imagined. But we can only know that, and benefit from it, if we
treat the Amendment with the seriousness that constitutional law
deserves. Unlike the T.S. Eliot verse quoted at the beginning of
Part I, though, understanding Article I, Section 27 in this way does
not represent "the end of all our exploring. 3 26 Rather, it pro-
vides a sounder basis for addressing the challenges that lie ahead.
325. See, e.g., Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 469 (Pa. 1979).
326. Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 59 (1943).
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